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ABSTRACT
For years the advent of the digital economy has left countries stumped
in their attempt to tax income earned by foreign firms without physical
presence within their jurisdiction. International organizations and their
member countries have failed in their attempts to tweak the rules of the
international tax regime and address these challenges presented by the
digital economy. This article argues that such conservative approach
could not work, and fundamental reform is inevitable. The article
proposes a withholding tax solution, explaining its merits and
demonstrating its superiority over alternative reforms proposed to date.
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INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
Adaptability is key to survival.1 This famous Darwinist insight is apt,
albeit metaphorically, for a contemporary analysis of the international tax

1. Insightful, even though often wrongfully attributed to Charles Darwin. See Darwin
Correspondence Project, University of Cambridge, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/people/
about-darwin/six-things-darwin-never-said#quote1(last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
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regime.2 Legal norms are constantly challenged by developments in the
human societies which they serve, and constantly face the choice between
certainty and fitness, between stability and adaptability, and between
tweaking and fundamental reforms. One could hardly think of a more
dramatic change than the digital revolution we all face at the present,3
changing our culture, our thinking, and our markets, naturally applying
pressure on legal regimes to respond.4
The international tax regime has struggled in face of this pressure.
From radio waves to satellite-remitted content, from distant catalogue
sales to electronic commerce, and cloud computing, the fundamental
physical presence requirement for tax jurisdiction has become
increasingly anachronistic.5 The current tax rules were designed for a
long gone, pure bricks-and-mortar economy, one that has begun to
change almost from the very beginning of the regime itself. 6 As
intangibles increasingly dominate cross-border trade, the traditional rules
begin to struggle.7 This struggle is evolving into a crisis with the more
recent advent of true digital transactions, in which “Signals, in effect, are
selling signals.”8 Charles Kingson wrote one of the first, and still one of
the most thoughtful and well-articulated scholarly articles on the taxation
of digital transactions.9 Kingson identified the difficulties involved with
international tax law reform and concluded that such reform would be
inevitable due to the incompatibility between the international tax regime
and the digital economy.10
The path to reform has, however, been treacherous. Beyond the
2. Or, generally, to the contemporary business environment, see, e.g., Martin Reeves &
Mike Deimler, Adaptability: The New Competitive Advantage, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 134 (2011).
3. See, e.g., MARSHALL MCLUHAN & BRUCE R. POWERS, THE GLOBAL VILLAGE:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN WORLD LIFE AND MEDIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1989); DIRK HELBING,
THINKING AHEAD—ESSAYS ON BIG DATA, DIGITAL REVOLUTION, AND PARTICIPATORY MARKET
SOCIETY (2015).
4. See, e.g., REINER SCHULZE & DIRK STAUDENMAYER, DIGITAL REVOLUTION:
CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE (2016); Stanford Technology Law Review’s 2012
Symposium: First Amendment Challenges in the Digital Age, available at https://law.stanford.edu
/stanford-technology-law-review-stlr/stlr-past-symposia/#slsnav-2013 (last visited Jan. 19,
2019).
5. Charles I. Kingson, The David Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing the Future, 51 TAX L. REV.
641 (1996) [hereinafter Kingson, Taxing the Future].
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229
(2014).
8. Kingson, Taxing the Future, supra note 5, at 649.
9. Id.
10. Id. See also Chang Hee Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue
Between Developed and Developing Countries, 4 J. KOREAN L. 19, 21 (2004) (“[D]igital
technology completely destroys the economic and legal basis for the existing rules of international
taxation, implying the necessity of a complete overhaul”).
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natural resistance to reform, powerful stakeholders, led by the most
developed world economies, understood that reform would entail loss of
their controlling dominance of the international tax regime,11 dominance
that allowed them to stack the odds in their favor in revenue terms.12
Geopolitical changes, most notably the decline of the superpowers and
the ascent of emerging economies, led by the BRICS countries,13 brought
with them demand for reform of the international tax rules in favor of
what they viewed as a fairer division of tax revenues. This change would
increase the taxing rights of source (or market) economies where
consumers or users reside,14 inevitably at the expense of the traditional
powerful economies, in which most of the world capital and multinational
enterprises (MNE) reside.15
The demand for reform went beyond the digital economy, yet it
coincided with its ascent and has been most clearly demonstrated in its
context.16 The digital economy permits MNE (usually resident in a
developed country) to fully operate in developing countries, taking
advantage of their markets without physical presence and hence without
sufficient taxable presence,17 giving a favorable (tax) outcome that would
be much more difficult and costly to devise in most old economy
contexts. Therefore, the digital economy presented taxpayers with

11. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 169 (1999)
(explaining that the regime is constructed around the network of bilateral tax treaties, essentially
all of which are modeled after the OECD Model Tax Convention). The original acknowledgment
of the existence of such a regime was in Avi-Yonah’s “The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation:
A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Pasquale Pistone & Yariv Brauner, Introduction, in THE BRICS AND THE
EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION (Pasquale Pistone & Yariv Brauner, eds.,
2015) [hereinafter Pistone & Brauner, THE BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
COORDINATION].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., BEPS Monitoring Group, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy (Feb.
2018), available at https://bepsmonitoringgroup.wordpress.com/tag/bmg/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2019).
15. See, e.g., Fortune, Visualize the Global 500, available at http://fortune.com
/global500/visualizations/?iid=recirc_g500landing-zone1 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).
16. See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-9789264192744-en.htm. In
this first BEPS document the OECD identified the “[a]pplication of treaty concepts to profits
derived from the delivery of digital goods and services” as a key pressure area that must be
addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected in action item 1. Id. at 47.
17. See, e.g., Peter Hongler & Pasquale Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax
Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy (WU Int’l Taxation Res. Paper Series No.
2015-15, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2591829 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter
Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the
Digital Economy].
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opportunities to make their taxation largely elective.18
Such tax planning flexibility affects not only developing countries but
also developed countries that have been starving for revenue and
struggling to protect their tax base, even prior to the global financial crisis
of the early 2000s.19 The outcome of the crisis was a sufficient similarity
of interests among most nations, whose politicians demanded change and
reform in what evolved into the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
project, of which, its primary goal was a solution to the tax challenges
presented by the digital economy.20 The inherent complexity of the issue
was exacerbated by the BEPS’s duality of purposes: to maximize
collection of taxes from MNE, likely favoring the more developed
countries; and a reform to the fundamental tax base division rules, likely
in favor of the less developed countries.21
Therefore, despite the demand of politicians for reform, the BEPS
representatives of countries with diverse and often conflicting interests
found it difficult to agree on the content of the reform, strengthening the
conservative voices whose energy was devoted to the discrediting of any
reform proposals and building on the necessary imperfection of any
proposal, which seemed par for the course in any complex and novel
matter. Even at the present, more than two decades after Kingson’s
article, serious scholars still question the wisdom of reform, advocating
alternatively a more traditional avenue of tweaking the existing rules and
applying them by analogy to the new economy and digital transactions.22
This conservative approach cannot prevail. It has been aggressively tried
and failed in recent decades.23 This Article demonstrates this conclusion,
18. See OECD, BEPS website, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019)
(describing the BEPS Project).
19. A process that started even earlier as a result of globalization as explained by Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
20. An important initial discussion of these matters took place within the G8 organization.
See, e.g., Prime Minister's Office & Cabinet Office, G8 factsheet: tax, GOV.UK (June 7, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax. It eventually led
to the G20 organization’s charge of the OECD with what became the BEPS project. See G20, G20
Leaders Declaration, at T48, G20 at Los Cabos, Mexico (June 18-19, 2012), https://www.g20.org/
sites/default/files/g2Oresources/library/G20_LeadersDeclarationFinalLosCabos.pdf. See also
OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16 (the original OECD
BEPS document).
21. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014) [hereinafter
Brauner, What the BEPS].
22. Most notably, Wolfgang Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the
Digitalized Economy, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX. 278 (2018) [hereinafter Schön, Ten Questions about
Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy].
23. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013) [hereinafter
OECD, ACTION P LAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING] (discussing the BEPS project and
the positioning of this issue as the project’s first action item). For the project’s final, not yet
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making, as its first contribution, the case for reform and explaining why
reform is both desirable and inevitable.
The second contribution of this Article is an analysis of the various
reform proposals considered in recent years and the assessment of the
circumstances required for their success. Many prescriptions for
international tax reform have been presented in recent years, yet at their
core they belong to two groups:24 (1) collaborative solutions, featuring a
new rule that would permit taxation of digital profits by the market
economies even when the taxpayers earning such profits lack physical
presence within their jurisdictions (a “virtual PE” solution, often referred
to as the nexus-based approach),25 and (2) solutions based on actions by
said market economies to tax digital presence within their jurisdiction in
a “rough justice” manner, reducing the benefits of unacceptable tax
planning by using BEPS through withholding taxes and equalization
levies.26
This Article advocates in favor of a withholding tax solution, arguing
that it is superior to all other alternatives in the current environment. Such
analysis is the third and primary contribution of this Article. The specific
proposed solution does not ring-fence the digital economy, but avoids
controversial, difficult to devise definitions, providing more taxing
opportunities for source jurisdictions (and therefore a fairer allocation of
global taxing rights). It would directly target base erosion and focus on
conclusive report, see OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/addressing-the-tax-challeng
es-of-the-digital-economy-action-1-2015-final-report-9789264241046-en.htm
[hereinafter
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL
REPORT]. For information on the OECD’s continuous effort on the matter, see OECD, TAX
CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, available at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-challenges-arising-from-digitalisation-interim-report-97892642930
83-en.htm.
24. This Article assumes that whatever reform is adopted, the general framework of
taxation will be kept as-is (i.e., taxation will remain at the exclusive power of nation-states and
such states will continue to use multiple types of taxes in an uncoordinated manner), particularly
preserving stand-alone income (and corporate income) taxes.
25. See, e.g., Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income
in the Era of the Digital Economy, supra note 17 (giving a concrete proposal for reform of the
current PE rules, expanding them to include virtual presence); OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 10713; OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note
23, at 135-39.
26. See, e.g., Andrés Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action
1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, (IBFD, White Paper Series 33, 2015)
[hereinafter Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper];
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 23, at 113-15 (withholding solution) & 115-17 (equalization levy); OECD,
TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 13940 (withholding taxes) & 139-44 (turnover taxes, including equalization levies).
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the biggest ticket items involving the largest amount of taxes, doing so
without fundamental violations of the current bases of the international
tax regime. This Article demonstrates that the withholding tax solution is
superior to the virtual PE solution, which relies on difficult-to-envision
agreements of many countries on the factors that establish the virtual
presence and on controversial definitions of the digital economy to which
it applies, which in effect ring-fences the digital economy against the
agreement of BEPS stakeholders.27 Furthermore, a nexus-based approach
requires difficult attribution of profits to a non-physical PE, a very
complex exercise within the current framework of the international tax
regime. In this regard, this Article adds that the withholding solution may
also be developed as a remedial tool to adequately implement the nexusbased approach if adopted. This Article rejects equalization levies and
similar solutions presented as interim measures, because such solutions
undermine the existing international tax regime and its nontrivial
achievements to date, portraying an unrealistic picture of temporariness,
and ring-fencing the digital economy or parts of it while not addressing
the key issues of BEPS.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows: Part I presents the
withholding solution advocated by this Article, its advantages, and key
design issues it presents. Part II demonstrates that fundamental reform of
the tax rules applicable to cross-border digital transactions is necessary,
rejecting the alternative of further tweaking of the current rules. Once the
necessity of reform is established, Part III discusses alternatives to the
proposal made by this article and actual country responses based on these
alternatives, evaluating them and explaining why they are less desirable
than the proposal advocated by this Article.
I. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: WITHHOLDING ON
DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS
A. The Proposal
This Article argues that in the current circumstances the international
tax regime should optimally adopt the withholding solution proposed in
this Part.28 The core proposal is to design a standard low rated final
withholding tax on all base-eroding payments to non-residents,29 with
27. See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 11.
28. An early version of the proposal was advocated during the BEPS project by Báez
Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper, supra note 26.
29. The White Paper, suggested a rate of 10%, yet for the purposes of the proposal the
exact rate is immaterial, so long as it is sufficiently low (perhaps in the 3%-10% range), widely
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specific standard exemptions from such withholding tax for payments
made to payees registered to be domestically taxed under the normal net
taxation scheme.30 Withholding or other tax arrangements that are already
in place,31 (provided by domestic law32 or by treaties33) should prevail
over the new tax and consequently left intact. Most of the common
international tax rules, such as those applicable to wages, dividends,
rents, and interest paid to non-residents, will continue to apply as
prescribed by the domestic law of the source country as amended by an
applicable tax treaty if any.
All other payments (i.e., business related, perhaps some fallingthrough-the-cracks payments, and base-eroding payments) will be
subject to the proposed, low withholding tax. The implementation (and
enforcement) of the tax will be done primarily with the help of a
corresponding rule that will require all business expenses to be matched
with a specific withholding tax (applicable, but not necessarily collected
at a rate above zero) or a specific exemption to be deductible. Each
deduction will require therefore an identified destination (payee ID and
residence)34 and an identified payment. Payments to unidentified payees
or to resident payees resident in non-cooperating jurisdictions should
incur a higher than standard withholding tax.35
Non base-eroding payments are a secondary concern of this Article,
because the primary challenge that they present to the current tax regime
is administrative. This Article, nevertheless, proposes to apply the same
taxing rules to these payments. Yet, because the primary administrative
challenge that they present is the ineffectiveness of customers, usually
individual, non-business customers who make the bulk of these payments
(think withholding agents like Amazon or Ebay) this Article argues that
the most plausible withholding agents in such cases must be the
facilitators of these payments (i.e., credit card and similar financial

accepted and neutral in the sense that it is not extrapolated from actual, currently imposed net
taxation rates.
30. The intellectual origins of this paper are in Richard Doernberg, Electronic Commerce
and International Tax Sharing, 16 TAX NOTES INT’L 1013 (1998).
31. Such as the taxation of income attributable to PE in the source/payment state.
32. Such as the withholding on wages. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 1441 & 3401-06 (the U.S. rules
that resemble most countries’ rules).
33. See, e.g., 2017 OECD Model art. 10(2) (capping domestic withholding on dividend
payments at 5% or 15%).
34. Beneficial ownership rules may need to be adapted to the new tax, yet their operation
should be no different than it is under the current rules.
35. The White Paper suggested a rate of 15%, yet again, the exact rate is immaterial, so
long as it is sufficiently higher than the withholding tax rate applicable to payments made to
participating jurisdictions. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1,
White Paper, supra note 26.
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institutions).36 The burden that such rule will add to these regulated
institutions does not seem to be excessive as they already possess
essentially all relevant information.37 Note that because these payments
are not base-eroding, countries will more easily be able to negotiate
different deals among themselves, reducing or even eliminating the
withholding tax, effectively converting the role of the financial
institutions in such cases to information gathering agents, a role that they
already regularly perform.
The rest of this Article will focus on the first part of the proposal that
applies to base-eroding payments, which is the primary contribution of
this Article. This proposal addresses the key concerns raised by the
advent of the digital economy and the BEPS project: insufficient or
difficult to collect source taxation, base erosion, and the lack of consensus
(and perhaps will) among nations to more tightly coordinate their taxation
of MNE. The focus on base-eroding payments is the core of the proposal,
stemming from the centrality of these payments to tax planning of the
kind targeted by the BEPS project (and generally by all productive, nonhaven countries), yet also realizing that such payments, mainly made in
Business-to-Business (B2B) transactions, are the most significant in
terms of revenue and impact.38 Next, this Part begins to make the case for
the proposal with an explanation of the importance of its focus on B2B
payments.
B. Key Advantages of the Withholding Solution
1. Focus on B2B
Meeting the challenges presented by the digital economy is vital for
the stability of the international tax regime, few could ignore that, yet the
exact focus of the desired reform is more controversial. The current
discourse has been enveloped in the BEPS project, enjoying the benefits
of political support but at the same time being handcuffed by the rhetoric
that comes hand in hand with such support. It was easy to focus on the
36. Intermediation services, such as Uber or Booking may equally serve this purpose,
would require a rule that would easily identify them and coordinate their obligations with those
of the financial institutions.
37. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service, for example, already requires credit card companies
and similar third parties to report various types of transactions that they facilitate. See, e.g., IRS
website, https://www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/third-party-reporting-information-center-informa
tion-documents (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
38. Consumer-to-Business (C2B) and Consumer-to-Consumer (C2C) payments do not
erode the tax base of the source countries since they are not typically deductible. They are also
dwarfed by cross-border B2B transactions. See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDE TO MEASURING THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 204 (2011); OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 55.
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most famous, largest MNE, household names in every house. For the
media, which very much made BEPS a reality, it was particularly easy to
highlight a lack of source taxation that almost everybody in the world
could identify with, because almost everybody had been knowingly
guilty of not paying taxes on personal online purchases. Much of the
discourse, therefore used the Amazon or eBay purchases narrative,
directly or indirectly in the discussion and consequently in the design of
reform proposals.39 Policymakers followed to this discourse, refraining
from making a critical distinction between B2B and Business-toConsumer (B2C) (or Customer-to-Customer (C2C))40 digital
transactions, despite the important differences in the type of transactions.
The lack of concern about base erosion where the latter are concerned
being one very relevant difference. This Article argues that this confusion
between media worthiness and salience led some of the discourse astray,
alternatively proposing to discuss the two business forms separately, and
primarily target B2B transactions that dominate the digital economy and
present the most severe BEPS challenges.
The B2B model dominates the digital economy and is expected to
continue to do so despite the projected growth in both B2C and C2C.41
B2B payments present therefore the biggest challenge to the international
tax regime, beyond their base-eroding properties, being the largest in
terms of both nominal magnitude and revenue potential, and at the same
time the most complex, and hence difficult to track and analyze, because
they are often among related parties or part of complex corporate business
relationship, and not merely an individual purchasing a book on
amazon.com with a credit card. The good news is that experience with
early ecommerce demonstrates that self-reporting and withholding
obligations were much more effective in the B2B context, especially
when the payer benefits from a tax deduction for the payment (a more
common than not reality in B2B), than in the B2C context. We all know
the ineffectiveness of similar measures when imposed on final individual
consumers. The withholding solution is the only existing alternative that
discerns between these easily distinguishable sectors of the digital
economy and provides solutions tailor-made to each, focusing on salience
rather than on the media worthiness of the challenges.

39. See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, annex B (Typical Tax Planning Structures in
Integrated Business Models).
40. As explained below, this Article argues that for its purposes the differences between
B2C and C2C are substantively unimportant and administratively minor and therefore it discusses
them together.
41. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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2. Focus on Base-Eroding Payments
The precise focus of the proposed solution is on base-eroding
payments. This focus goes hand in hand with its enforcement mechanism
and the unique legitimacy and efficacy benefits of the proposal. The
BEPS project made base erosion its primary target. Although profit
shifting is also a key target of the project it comes in different varieties,
not all of which benefit from the same support. Shifting from residence
countries to “havens” is “in,” yet shifting away from source countries is
much less so. Base erosion is presented by the BEPS project as
inappropriate and worthy of fighting because of the arbitrage opportunity
it presents: reducing usually high tax in a productive jurisdiction without
actual taxation anywhere; this result annihilates the reason for the
deduction (generation of “more,” typically taxable income) and violates
the matching principle—between deductions and income. The idea is that
successful productive activity cannot end up not taxed anywhere, a
fortiori not reducing the overall effective taxation. The Withholding
solution is the only alternative directly targeting the harm (base erosion)
that BEPS alleges to prevent.
3. The Proposed Solution Avoids the Addition
of Problematic Definitions
The BEPS work on Action 1 struggled to define the digital economy.
Reading most of the work on this topic, one gets the impression that the
preferred approach is to use a mechanism of the “smell test” sort to
identify digital economy issues. This may be useful, especially in a
preliminary investigative stage such as the one in which the BEPS Project
is currently engaged. However, it would be problematic if one were to
impose an actual tax on digital transactions. This is particularly important
for withholding taxes, which to be successful depends on a reasonably
clearly defined target or payment. A reasonably clearly defined target or
payment is required because otherwise withholding agents, upon whom
compliance with the rules is critical to their efficacy, are unlikely to act
optimally. They may overwithhold simply to relieve themselves of any
potential liability. Such behavior would result in undue hardship for
investors and thereby hinder the digital economy, which is clearly
something the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) is careful not to do. Withholding agents might also
underwithhold, succumbing to pressure applied by the taxpayer based on
the vagueness of the definition, naturally defeating the purpose of the
rule. Therefore, for a definition to be useful, it needs to be reasonably
clear.
The definition must also be standard. The core of the current
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difficulties faced by the international tax regime, leading to the BEPS
Project, was the variety of different, uncoordinated domestic law
responses to the same international tax issues. Furthermore, the definition
must correspond to the purpose of the rule using the definition—the
imposition of a withholding tax mechanism. It would therefore be futile,
for example, to rely on a generally accurate, dictionary-style definition if
it cannot be appropriately used to identify when one should or should not
withhold. These three conditions seem obvious, yet a quick review of the
literature on the taxation of the digital economy reveals that little
attention was paid to them in recent years.
The term “digital economy” is often traced to a 1997 book titled The
Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked
Intelligence.42 As of yet, a useful, universal legal definition has yet to be
produced (by that book or elsewhere). In an often-cited work, Australia
defined the digital economy as “the global network of economic and
social activities that are enabled by platforms such as the Internet, mobile
and sensor networks.”43 This is an example of a rather useful dictionary
definition that cannot be used for our purposes. One could imagine a
paraphrase of such definition such as “all payments in connection with
economic and social activities that are enabled by platforms such as the
Internet, mobile and sensor networks.” The problem with this definition
is that it is probably both over- and under-inclusive.
A lot of payments, perhaps even most business payments, relate in
some way or other to digital economy networks and it may be difficult to
determine when this relation is sufficient to mandate withholding.
Moreover, payments are often made with remote connection to digital
products but with immediate connection to non-digital products in
circumstances where the payor (and definitely the payee) are unaware of
the connection. Such circumstances may indicate an appropriate
circumstance for nonwithholding, yet it would be difficult to draw the
line here and to distinguish true and merely declared ignorance in these
cases. The definition may be underinclusive since it mentions particular
platforms that may not be exhaustive even at present and are unlikely to
be so in future. The use of nonexclusive language (“such as”) provides
little remedy because it is too general and likely to end up being too vague

42. DON TAPSCOTT, THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: PROMISE AND PERIL IN THE AGE OF
NETWORKED INTELLIGENCE (1997).
43. Australian Government, Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital
Economy, What is the digital economy?, available at http://www.dbcde.gov.au/digital_economy/
what_is_the_digital_economy (accessed July 9, 2012), cited in Jinyan Li, Protecting the Tax
Base in the Digital Economy, Papers on Selected Topics in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing
Countries, Draft Paper No. 9, June 2014: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/2014TBP/Paper9_Li.pdf
(accessed Nov. 1, 2014).
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and useless again. Other proposals do not fare better.44
Unable to satisfactorily define the digital economy, one may limit the
definition to its most important applications. Indeed, to date, most of the
work in this context had been done on electronic commerce.45 Alas, that
work focused on the redefinition of the PE notion to include digital
presence. Such redefinition is not helpful for the purposes of this Part if
we wish to use it to impose a withholding tax that does not require a PE
to be established. In 2011, the OECD came up with: “An electronic
transaction is the sale or purchase of goods or services, conducted over
computer networks by methods specifically designed for the purpose of
receiving or placing of orders.”46 This definition is too limited since it
does not adequately address digital goods and services.
This Article does not argue that a pragmatic approach could not reach
a workable definition. An instrumental definition that would emphasize
precision, even at the expense of limiting the scope, could work, perhaps
through the use of specific platforms, yet with the understanding that the
evolution of the digital economy may quickly make these platforms
obsolete. A mechanism to update and improve the definition would have
to be put in place to make it workable and address this issue in the
future.47 Nonetheless, this Article argues that the withholding solution
presents a unique opportunity as the only alternative that does not
necessitate reliance on imperfect definitions. The withholding solution
proposed by this Article is to simply tax all that is currently not regulated,
all base-eroding payments that are not already covered by existing rules,
and therefore, it directly targets base erosion and profit shifting in the
digital economy.
4. No Ring-Fencing
A direct consequence of the unique approach of the proposed
withholding solution is that it does not ring-fence the digital economy,
equally targeting non-digital base-eroding payments that are not currently
taxed or explicitly exempted at source. The BEPS work, following
essentially all of the experts in the field, has consistently made the nonring-fencing a condition for a workable solution to the challenges
presented by the digital economy.48 At the moment, the withholding
44. See, e.g., OECD definition from 2012: “The digital economy is comprised of markets
based on digital technologies that facilitate the trade of goods and services through e-commerce,”
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/The-Digital-Economy-2012.pdf, at 5.
45. Most notably OECD Model Commentary on Art. 5, ¶¶ 122-131.
46. See OECD, GUIDE TO MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, supra note 38, at 72.
47. See discussion in Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1,
White Paper, supra note 26.
48. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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solution proposed by this Article is the only alternative meeting this
condition.49
5. More Taxation at Source
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the withholding solution is
that it also meets head-on the goal of increasing taxation at the source.
This is an acknowledged goal of the BEPS project, yet one that remains
challenged and only partially attained by the project. 50 There should be
little doubt that BEPS was originally driven inter alia by the demand of
source jurisdictions, and most importantly by the demands of China and
India for expanded taxing rights at the source for so-called market
economies.51
To date these demands have achieved little, resulting in a renewed
push in the context of the digital economy framed in different ways, most
importantly based on “user participation” as a justification for more
taxation at the source.52 The discussion of this justification has been
complex and fraught with competing arguments that are difficult to
balance, a task that is beyond the scope of this Article. Because the
withholding solution does not require a particular justification for taxing
transactions at the source, it directly meets the goal of more taxation at
the source, providing the balance between source and residence taxation
through the recommended low rate of withholding tax.

49. The only other proposal potentially compliant with this condition may be the U.S.
marketing intangible based proposal, yet this proposal has not yet been made public and the
assessment of whether it will or not ring fence the digital economy depends on the details of the
proposals.
50. See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16, at
35-36; Brauner, What the BEPS, supra note 21, at 111-12.
51. See, e.g., Pistone & Brauner, THE BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
COORDINATION, supra note 12, at 4-5; Manoj Kumar Singh, Taxation of the Digital Economy: An
Indian Perspective, 45 INTERTAX 467 (2017); Diheng Xu, The Convergence and Divergence
Between China’s Implementation and OECD/G20 BEPS Minimum Standards, 3 WORLD TAX J.
471, 482-84 (2018) (examining the conflict over so-called “location-specific” advantages).
52. See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT
2018, supra note 23; Stephanie Soong Johnston, India’s Tax Chief: Digital Taxation Needs Fair
Allocation Rules, 92 TAX NOTES INT’L 435 (2018); Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, Taxing
Where Value is Created: What’s ‘User Involvement’ Got to Do with It?, 47 INTERTAX 161 (2019)
[hereinafter Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created]; HM Treasury, Corporate Tax
and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update (Mar. 2018), available at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/689240/corporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_update_web.pdf (last visited Feb. 11,
2019).
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6. Playing within the Rules of the Game
International taxation is a conservative field and reforms of the
international tax regime are particularly cautious in nature and therefore
gradual reforms that are easily reconcilable with the current rules of the
game are more likely to gain consideration, support, and eventually
legitimacy. This Article further seeks to accept the basic conditions
provided by the BEPS project in the design of its recommendations, the
most important of which is the preservation to the extent possible of the
corporate tax and the fundamental bases of the regime itself to preserve
the stability and achievements of the regime to date. It is impossible to
completely avoid innovation if one genuinely wishes to face the
challenges that the digital economy presents to the international tax
regime,53 a conclusion supported by the original BEPS documents.54
However, it is possible to do so with minimal incoherence as
demonstrated by the withholding solution. All the elements of the
withholding solution are familiar components of the current international
tax regime: withholding tax obligations, denial of deduction on baseeroding payments, registration in source jurisdictions, and information
reporting. Moreover, to the extent possible (and desired by the countries
involved) the withholding solution preserves all the current regime’s
taxing rules by exempting them from the proposed withholding tax,
leaving it applicable only to untaxed (or unreported) base-eroding
payments. The law and treaty changes required should be minimal and
focused, further demonstrating its compatibility with the current regime.
Finally, the proposal operates within the current regime, unlike certain
proposals, such as equalization levies that purport to operate outside the
regime by adding a tax (the levy in this case) to the mix, claiming
disingenuously, that it is external to the current international tax regime
and hence not in conflict with its rules.55
7. The Proposed Solution is Feasible: Unilaterally or
Multilateral Adoption
BEPS action 1 and the following OECD/inclusive framework output
related to the taxation of the digital economy make it difficult to predict
which course stakeholders may take, since their actions to date included
inconsistent leaps from one idea to another without follow up research on
any single proposal.56 A realistic proposal feasibility should be tested
53.
54.
at 20.
55.
56.

See infra Part II.
See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23,
See infra Part III.B.
See also Yariv Brauner, Editorial: Developments on the Digital Economy Front –
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under different scenarios to see if the withholding solution withstands
such a test. It could be adopted both unilaterally and multilaterally (under
various possible options) with little impact on its desirability to the
adopter.
Unilateral adoption of the solution is straightforward, because it
merely requires the enactment of the proposed solution, and, if relevant,
adaptation of treaties to accommodate the solution.57 Unilateral actions
in response to the use of the digital economy to undermine domestic tax
bases is already prevalent, through the use of multiple measures, typically
inferior to the withholding solution.58 The main disadvantage of a
unilateral solution would be the reduced incentive for other countries to
cooperate in the provision of information required for effective
implementation of the proposal. This may result in relatively high rates
of tax (although in the unilateral scenario the implementing country fully
controls the rate) and a concern about foreign investment. Another
equally plausible scenario may be positive registration of foreign
investors with the implementing country to avoid higher taxation. A
concern may arise about the ease of tax treaty negotiation and even about
relief of double taxation for the withholding tax, but unilateral adoption
is likely to occur in a world (not much different than the one we currently
live in) fraught with uncoordinated unilateral responses of productive
states to BEPS by digital MNE, aligning the interests of most countries,
and reducing the risks mentioned. Nonetheless, a coordinated,
multilateral adoption of the withholding solution more directly relieves
these concerns, because all of the involved parties would have an obvious
interest in standardization, coordinated relief of double taxation, and the
presentation of a single front against non-cooperating countries and their
residents.
Finally, one may doubt the possibility of collective action in this
context, especially in light of the unproductive BEPS process regarding
the digital economy, yet the withholding solution presents an opportunity
for a smaller number of countries to cooperate, achieving many of the
advantages of multilateral adoption, and, in addition, the advantage of the
first adopter with a voice, the power to determine the future course of the
solution. One can draw an analogy to the process that led to the adoption
of the Multilateral Instrument (MLI) to demonstrate how a
comprehensive, flexible solution could quickly attract the attention of
many countries, despite potential conflict with perceived maximization
of interests of such countries. Technically the multilateral solution is
quite similar to the unilateral solution, the sole difference is in the
Progress or Regression?, INTERTAX (forthcoming, 2019).
57. See infra Part I.D. Indeed, countries following UN Model article 12A have already
amended treaties with such a provision.
58. See infra Part III.
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standardization of the mechanism for the adoption of such legislation (a
multilateral rather than bilateral, or no treaty). Naturally, multilateral
adoption may follow initial unilateral adoption by multiple countries;
again, the process should have no effect on the operation of the solution.
8. Interim Conclusion
In conclusion, the withholding solution proposed by this Article meets
all the requirements from a solution to the challenges presented by the
digital economy to the international tax regime made by the BEPS project
and general policy considerations. This Article argues and further
demonstrates that in the case of some of these requirements the
withholding solution is the only alternative that meets them, leading to
the conclusion that it is superior to all other alternatives.
C. Design Issues
The digital economy presents not only new business models that
conceptually challenge current tax rules, but also severe practical
challenges to the ability of governments to collect revenue. In many
cases, governments simply have not been collecting revenue from the
digital economy,59 and in others the collection fell short, triggering inter
alia the BEPS Project.60 Administration of measures to tax the digital
economy is therefore paramount, requiring special care with the design
of such measures.
1. Rates
Unlike normal tax rates that reflect the political choices of nation
states, the rate of tax imposed by the withholding solution should
preferably be internationally standard and set. This is because the purpose
of the tax is to set a fair and legitimate standard for division of revenue
among residence and source states. The digital economy discourse raised
several more complex mechanisms, yet it is important to understand that
the choice of a withholding tax to tackle the challenges presented by the
digital economy means a preference for a simple and somewhat crude
solution, and a view of reality where international collaboration is
minimal (in comparison to the digital PE approach, for example).
It is likely that in the large majority of cases the tax would simply
59. See, e.g., the moratorium on taxation of the Internet. This is the U.S. “Internet Tax
Freedom Act” that was first passed by Congress in 1998 and has since been extended several
times.
60. See, e.g., OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23,
20.
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mean that the source state collects and keeps it, no more, no less, and
therefore the rate should reflect an appropriate share of the tax base
allocated to the source state. It should be sufficiently high, viewed as a
final tax shadowing the corporate tax. Another reason to keep it
sufficiently high would be to satisfy its base erosion role.
The rate should also be kept sufficiently low, to satisfy the residence
countries that control the international tax regime at the present and hence
may perceive the withholding tax as a concession they make in favor of
source jurisdictions. This argument is quite weak since the residence
jurisdictions have not been collecting on this tax base much in the first
place, yet politically it may be viewed as powerful. A more significant
reason not to set the rate too high would be to reduce the incentives to
evade it. Note, however, that the latter is not an optimization argument,
since it is likely that taxpayers will continue to have incentives to attempt
avoidance or evasion of the tax at any acceptable level (one could study
this point in more depth, but it is beyond the scope of this Article). It is
rather an argument based on the aspiration to design the tax according to
its purpose and keep it at a level that would be generally perceived as fair
and legitimate by the largest number of countries possible. Furthermore,
the tax should be kept at a level that would not significantly hamper crossborder business.
Taking all this into account, the rate should be anywhere between 5%
(that may be viewed as insignificant by source jurisdictions as this is a
rate often charged by accommodating conduit jurisdictions for treaty
shopping accommodation) and 15% (a level close to the actual net
corporate tax rate in some jurisdictions). Therefore, 10% comes to mind
to make calculations simple, but of course this is not a magic number and
it could be negotiated up or down without qualitatively changing the
proposal.
Additionally, another rate should be used to address payments to
noncompliant jurisdictions. It is well known that it is difficult to define
tax havens, yet for the purposes of this proposal that inherently embodies
a choice for a simple, perhaps imperfect solution, it is clear that a simple
line should be drawn. The same 15% corporate tax rate comes to mind,
but, again, the threshold rate could be a little higher or lower with little
effect on this proposal. The elevated withholding tax rate should match.
The proposal should therefore impose an elevated (perhaps 15%)
withholding tax on payments to non-registered payees, including payees
resident in jurisdictions with a corporate tax rate below 15%. Note that a
PE of a resident of a sub-15% jurisdiction in a non-sub 15% jurisdiction
should be eligible to register as such and enjoy the lower rate. Also note
that the tax rate does not address effective tax rate reductions. This is
partly to keep the solution simple and easily workable, and partly because
harmful tax competition issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
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2. Exemptions
A full description of exemptions from the withholding solution is
beyond the scope of this Article. The basic idea is to capture all payments
not subject to a taxing rule at the present (with a strong preference for
capturing base-eroding payments) with as little disruption as possible to
the current rules of the international tax regime (reflecting the
conservative evolutionary approach), and without resort to definitions of
digital payments.
Therefore, low-risk payments to identifiable taxpayers already taxed
on a net basis should be exempt. The most obvious examples would be
wages and deductible payments made to PE (in the same country). These
payments do not present a classification difficulty because they are easily
and clearly distinguished from other payments, and they are already
subject to unique tax regimes (typically employer withholding in the case
of wages and regular net corporate taxation in the case of PE) with little
concern about abuse by manipulation of classifications.
Interest and dividend payments (but not royalties) should similarly be
exempt. Dividends are not generally base-eroding payments and are
usually controlled by Article 10 of bilateral tax treaties. As such, they
present no unique problem from the perspective of the digital economy.61
Interest payments are base-eroding payments, yet, they do not present any
unique challenges in the context of payments related to the digital
economy.62
All other business payments, including royalties,63 will be subject to
the withholding tax unless countries believe that they are clearly beyond
the scope of the digital economy. For example, payment for the rental of
equipment, land or buildings, or for their purchase, payment for material
and payments for services entailing individuals present on-site. The
construction of a list of standard payments should not be complex.
61. Hybrid arrangements may present challenges for dividend payments, yet these are not
unique to the digital economy and are dealt with, to the extent possible, by BEPS Action 2, and
hence are beyond the scope of this Article.
62. Limitation on interest deductions are handled by BEPS Action 4, and many countries’
implementation of its recommendation. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163(j) (replacing the former earning
stripping rule with the standard set by BEPS Action 4).
63. One could argue that so-called “literary” royalties should remain within the scope of tax
treaties’ Art. 12, yet we do not see the theoretical support for the distinction between royalties and
business profits, especially in the context of the digital economy. In any event, if countries insist
on that, Art. 12 may simply be left intact or amended to whatever scope countries wish. This
action may create an area of uncertainty and open an opportunity for taxpayers to more
aggressively include as many payments as possible within the scope of Art. 12. In the authors’
view, this is inappropriate, yet it does not interfere with the analysis of the withholding solution
and its superiority to alternative solutions for taxing the digital economy; a fundamental axiom of
the international tax regime is that it never obligates a country to tax where it does not wish to do
so.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347503

20

TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY POST BEPS . . . SERIOUSLY

[2019

There may be some controversial payments, but if their treatment
follows the principles set out above, the method should be fairly noncontroversial. These miscellaneous payments, clearly not digital
economy payments, may be more susceptible to manipulation than the
other exemptions. Taxpayers would have a clear incentive to inflate these
payments, perhaps at the expense of other (closer to the digital economy)
payments. However, the scale of abuse should be lower than any
definition-based mechanism that would not be based on a widely scoped
withholding tax.
First, because such payments are already subject to other tax
safeguards, such as the transfer pricing rules. Second, the country of the
payor would have the strongest incentive to ensure that exempt payments
are not inflated. As a market country, it is also in the best position to
monitor the application of the rules: the payment is likely made within its
jurisdiction, it is its tax base that is eroded and the payor (who is the
withholding agent, not the taxpayer) is under its control.
The most difficult cases are likely to be base-eroding payments for
mixed equipment bundled with software, such as computerized
machinery. The difficulty would be to allocate the appropriate price to
each component, yet, every country already faces similar issues, typically
requiring delineation of payments to the appropriate categories and
treating truly bundled products or products where a certain piece (e.g.,
the software) is deminimis as a single property belonging to the dominant
category (typically equipment in this context) or the category that more
easily fits into the standard tax analysis, and unlikely to be subject to the
proposed withholding tax.64
3. Finality
Every withholding tax presents the question of finality, being a
practical, inaccurate gross tax mechanism in a system dominated by net
taxation. It is always simpler to use a final withholding tax, yet this often
means sacrificing accuracy or neutrality. Unilateral adoption of the
withholding solution should probably employ a final tax. The mere
choice of a withholding tax reflects preference for simplicity and
certainty, and a final tax would serve this preference better. Moreover,
the price such country is likely to pay in terms of accuracy and neutrality
are not completely sacrificed, since the tax would be final only from the
perspective of the payment state in the case that the residence state would
provide a credit for the tax. The relative low rate of the tax should make
such credit mechanism meaningful and meet the purpose of the tax: a
fairer division of revenue between the source and the residence states.
64. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18(b)(2).
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Fairness may require that the elevated rate for payments to nonregistered payees not be final, especially if a period of transition into the
tax should be permitted. A country may provide an option to payees
subject to this rate to file a tax return, claiming a refund of the excess rate
paid to the country of source. The return should be filed with both
jurisdictions consistently. Such mechanisms benefit both the source
country that preserves its tax base and the residence country or the regime
as a whole, because it secures its integrity, obtaining complete
information about transactions, and fully taxing them.
The choice of a withholding tax necessarily entails a significant
burden on struggling enterprises. These may include start-up companies,
companies in transition, loss-making companies, and low-margin
companies. For these companies, the tax would mean a pure cost (and a
cash strap) that further encumbers them and makes it difficult for them to
succeed. These companies also differ from each other in their loss of
support by the system. We may wish to support start-up companies, but
not necessarily help lengthen the winding-down period for failed
enterprises. It is difficult, however, to fairly distinguish between these
types of companies, and past experience demonstrates that such attempts
have not necessarily been successful.65 It is perhaps possible to add
special rules for start-up companies that would work better, perhaps via
special registration, but this Article prefers the option each enterprise
gets—to register and be taxed on a net basis, which sufficiently balances
the impact of this tax. Lastly, if countries are seriously concerned about
the impact of this tax, they may further balance it in other ways, such as
ensuring carry-forward of foreign tax credits, special exemptions, or even
refund schemes.
4. Transition
Transition rules are sensitive to the specific rules adopted, so it may
be too early to attempt to prescribe them in this Article, yet one
observation is appropriate for a more complete analysis of the proposal,
and to demonstrate that transition is not a weakness of the proposal. The
withholding solution introduces a new mechanism and a broad, default
withholding obligation. This would require legislation and regulation in
all participating countries, a process that may take time and is open to
manipulation in the interim. Nevertheless, a major shift of real business
is unlikely to happen in response to the tax, because the focus of
compliance and enforcement is on the market and the destination, which
could not easily be abused, rather than the more mobile residence or
origin.
65. The U.S. exceptions from the PFIC regime are an example. See I.R.C. § 1298(b).
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5. Incentives
Countries should consider the use of incentives to promote proper
withholding. There is ample experience in the employment tax and VAT
areas that could help here. One example demonstrates this thought:
countries could agree on a very small administrative award to the
withholding agents.66 This award could be facilitated similarly to a tax
refund. The critical stage in the imposition of a withholding tax such as
that proposed in this Article is its launch. In order to encourage
compliance that would ensure its success, incentives should prove useful.
These incentives may be tested over time and reviewed and amended as
needed.
6. Versatility
The withholding solution is the optimal solution for the current state
of affairs, as demonstrated throughout this Article. One cannot reliably
predict the political responses to such reform. A major advantage of the
withholding solution however is its versatility, its capability of
functioning as a single, overall solution as suggested by this Article, or
as a solution to the most acute challenge that the digital economy
presents: the taxation of cross-border services,67 or even as an
implementation mechanism for profit allocation to virtual PE if the nexus
approach were adopted.68
7. An “Alternative” Design: Withholding on Services
An alternative design of the withholding solution could limit the
withholding obligation to cross-border services without loosing the
advantages of the original proposal.69 Reasons for this restriction may
include: first, As regards sales of goods in general (both B2B and B2C)
the problem of online retailers has nominally already been addressed
under OECD BEPS Action 7,70 and Article 13 of MLI. Indeed, despite
66. The monitoring system for VAT purposes in Sao Paulo, Brazil that also requires
registration and electronic monitoring of invoices. Ordinance CAT No. 128/2013, published in
the official Gazette of the State of São Paulo on 10/25/2013.
67. See Andrés Báez Moreno & Yariv Brauner, Reforming “Nexus”: Fitting the Existing
International Tax Framework Around the Digital Economy Tax Policy Options Regarding Tax
Challenges of the Digitalised Economy Under the Benjamin Franklin’s Rule for Decision Making
[hereinafter Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus”], in TAX AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY:
CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (Werner Haslehner ed., forthcoming 2019).
68. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper,
supra note 26.
69. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67.
70. OECD, Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action
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the limited (quantitative) success of article 13 of the MLI and the doubt
surrounding attribution rules to the newly created PEs,71 the significant
reduction of PE exceptions in Art. 5(4) of the OECD Model will
theoretically allow the Source State—that is, the state in which the
‘logistic PE’ is located—to tax many ‘digital sales of goods’ that had been
untaxed before its implementation.72 To the extent any new withholding
also covers digital sales of goods, its interaction with the extended
‘logistic PE’ should be resolved. One possible solution might be a rule
similar to the PE provision in Articles 10(4), 11(4) and 12(3) of the
OECD Model that would place income derived from digital sales of
goods back in the category of PE taxation. However, to achieve that result
it might be simpler to exclude all goods from the new withholding tax.
Without a special rule addressing such potential conflict, the coexistence
of ‘logistic PEs’ and a withholding tax covering sales of goods will
inevitably raise characterization issues. Second, any future reform
involving the expansion of source taxing rights on business income would
require changes to current bilateral tax treaties. However, a withholding
tax (just) on services would require fewer fundamental changes to tax
treaties and even be in accordance with the current literal language of a
significant number of existing ones.73 Third, limiting a withholding just
to services might also avoid problems of compatibility with WTO Law,
if any.74
Beyond the technical advantages this option realizes that the
digitalized economy is, by and large, an economy of services. 75 Indeed
7 – 2015 Final 285 (2015).
71. See Lisa Spinosa & Vikram Chand, A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized
Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the
Issue or Should the Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?, 46 INTERTAX 476, 481-90
(2018).
72. Of course, the problem remains for suppliers without logistic centers in the market
jurisdictions. See Georg Kofler, Gunter Mayr, & Christoph Schlager, Taxation of the Digital
Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, 57 EUR. TAX’N 527 (2017) [hereinafter Kofler
et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?]; Georg Kofler,
Gunter Mayr, & Christoph Schlager, Taxation of the Digital Economy: A Pragmatic Approach to
Short-Term Measures, 58 EUR. TAX’N 123, 124 s. 2.2 (2018).
73. See infra Part I.D.
74. See infra Part I.E.
75. See also Jinyan Li, Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy [hereinafter Li,
Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy], in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED
ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 407, 424 (Alexander Trepelkov
et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING
THE TAX BASE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES]; BEPS MONITORING GROUP, COMMENT, IN OECD,
TAX CHALLENGES OF DIGITALISATION: COMMENTS RECEIVED ON THE REQUEST FOR INPUT PART I,
at 20, 27 (2017); David Orzechowski, The Taxation of Fees for Technical, Managerial and
Consultancy Services in the Digital Economy with Respect to Art. 12A of the 2017 UN Model,
in Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Fifteenth Session,
E/C.18/2017/CRP.23 1, 29 (UN 2017).
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the new business models of the digitalized economy have enlarged the
very space of services (servitization) while expanding their overall
quantitative importance. The advent of ‘cloud computing,’ which has
actually turned software into service, is a classic example of servitization.
Despite the doubts expressed by the 2015 OECD BEPS Action 1 Report
on characterization,76 it is clear that cloud-computing arrangements
should qualify for tax purposes as service contracts. As for expanding the
quantitative importance of certain new business models, online
advertising is just one case in point; the advantages of Internet advertising
in comparison to traditional channels—by means of ‘user-generated
content’ provided for ‘free’ by customers in two-sided platforms and
subsequent tailored advertising—has provoked a dramatic increase in
these services, with an expected growth rate of 12.1% per year over the
period from 2014 to 2019.77 Similarly, digitalization has increased the
importance of intermediation services, both between businesses and
consumers78 and among consumers themselves.79
D. Tax Treaty Implications
If the withholding solution were to be implemented, amendments to
the OECD Model and tax treaties would be required. With the view to
minimize changes to the Model language, this article proposes the
following amendments.
1. A New Article 7(4)
The new article should provide:
Payments made by an enterprise of a Contracting State or borne by
a permanent establishment situated in a Contracting State may be
taxed in that State. The tax so charged shall not exceed:
76. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 104-06. Some authors have correctly pointed out that both the
2014 OECD BEPS Deliverable and the 2015 OECD BEPS Action 1 Report overstate the alleged
lack of guidance regarding cloud computing, probably reflecting an invigorated revenue interest
of the source state (Matthias Valta, Article 12 (Income from Royalties), in KLAUS VOGEL ON
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 1000 (m.note 107) (Ekkehart Reimer & Alexander Rust, eds.,
4th ed. 2015).
77. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 113-14. Additionally, figures show that online advertising may
only be in its infancy. See, e.g., Assaf Prussak, The Income of the 21st Century: Online Advertising
as a Case Study for the Implications of Technology for Source-Based Taxation, 16 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 39, 53 (2013).
78. A good example would be digital travel agencies, such as Booking.com.
79. This is the model of platforms within the collaborative economy such as Airbnb & Uber.
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(a) (10) per cent of the gross amount of the payments if the payee
is an enterprise of the other Contracting State or a permanent
establishment situated therein duly registered with the firstmentioned Contracting State for the purposes of this paragraph;
and
(b) (15) per cent of the gross amount of the payments in all other
cases.
A contracting state may not tax a payment borne by a permanent
establishment of an enterprise of the same contracting state
situated elsewhere.
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by
mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this tax,
including specified exemptions for non-base-eroding and other
similar payments.
2. The Commentary
This Article further proposes additions to the commentary for the sake
of standardization of the exemptions to the withholding solution.
3. Other Adjustments
The old article 7(4) should become article 7(5). Article 7(1) Should
be amended to begin with the phrase: “Subject to the provision of
paragraph 4. Finally, although seemingly more than a minor adjustment,
the article recommends that article 12 be considered for elimination.
Article 12 primarily taxes income that is, in essence, business income,
and therefore should be folded into article 7. The new withholding tax
will capture payments not subject to article 7(1) and would not hurt any
source taxation. There is no need to amend articles 10, 11, and 15.
All the above depends on a standard registration and qualifications
scheme that could be developed in the Commentary or externally to the
Model. In any event, it should not affect the text of the Model itself for
the sake of effectiveness and flexibility. If countries chose to more strictly
standardize a withholding tax solution, specific amendments may be
made to articles 26 and 27 of the OECD Model to adapt the mutual
assistance and information exchange mechanisms to the withholding
solution. Of course, the registration scheme should improve the efficacy
of treaty information exchange.
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4. An “Alternative” Treaty Provision for a Withholding Tax on Services
If the limited option of restricting the withholding solution to services
is elected, current article 12A of the UN Model Tax Convention could be
followed. In 2017, the UN Model was revised to include a new provision
attributing taxing rights to Source States with respect to fees for technical
services in the absence of a PE. UN Art. 12A followed a growing trend
in tax treaties concluded between developing countries and, to a lesser
extent, between developing and developed countries, to include separate
provisions allowing source taxation of ‘fees for technical services.’80
Apart from minor technical details, this new distributive rule would
preserve the taxing rights of source states that choose to limit the
withholding solution to services of the type described in this Article.81
E. Potential Discrimination Issues: WTO, EU & Treaty Law
A withholding tax proposal such as the withholding solution implies
different treatment of domestic and cross-border transactions that in some
circumstances may entail a breach of non-discrimination obligations
under WTO, EU, and tax treaty Law. Withholding on cross-border
transactions on the basis of gross payments as opposed to taxation on a
net basis (the norm in domestic income taxation) has been routinely
accused of infringing EU law, particularly with respect to EU
fundamental freedoms.82 Similar argument were made83 based on
potential violations of international economic laws (i.e., the General
Agreement on Tariffs (GATT),84 and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).85 Furthermore, since the withholding solution is based
80. See Wim Wijnen, Jan de Goede, & Andrea Alessi, The Treatment of Services in Tax
Treaties, 66 BULL. INT’L TAX’N, 27, 27-33 (2012) (documenting survey conducted); Angharad
Miller, TAXING CROSS-BORDER SERVICES: CURRENT WORLDWIDE PRACTICES AND THE NEED FOR
CHANGE, 147 (2016).
81. Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67 (analyzing those details).
82. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick
Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How
to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22, at 286.
83. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital Economy: ‘Quick
Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How
to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22, at 286.
84. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994).
85. General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994).
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on a self-enforcing mechanism according to which the deduction of
payments to non-residents for covered transactions is made conditional
on the effective withholding, it may constitute a violation of Article 24(4)
of bilateral tax treaties fashioned after the 2017 OECD or UN Models if,
in fact, the deduction of similar payments to residents are not subject to a
similar condition.
The first option for resolving these problems would be to simply
extend the withholding obligation to similar domestic transactions.86
Some commentators have claimed that extending the scope of ‘digital
taxes,’ be they withholding taxes or equalization levies, to cover purely
domestic transactions would have a dramatic, anti-technology impact,87
However, as regards withholding taxes88 such effect is not expected as a
result of the extension of a withholding obligation to domestic
transactions. Indeed, in a treaty context (when the treaty provides for
source taxation of the corresponding transactions)89 the tax withheld at
source would be credited in the Residence State.90 In a non-treaty context,
depending on domestic regulation, the tax withheld at source would be
creditable, in principle, in the Residence State according to a
corresponding unilateral foreign tax credit. A purely domestic scenario
should be handled in the same manner. If the withholding is extended to
also cover domestic situations, the tax withheld will be creditable against
domestic (mainstream) corporate income tax. In any case, the material
outcome of this extension would be irrelevant if one considers that
companies performing domestic transactions would normally have to
make advance tax payments, which may be equivalent to an eventual new
withholding tax on domestic transactions.91
Should the extension of the withholding solution to domestic
transactions not be accepted, different potential discriminations should be
considered. First, WTO law obligations. Both GATT and GATS require
their signatories to tax foreign suppliers of goods and services no less
favorably than its own domestic suppliers. GATS, However, provides
broad exceptions when the signatory applies direct tax measures.92 More
specifically, GATS Art. XIV(d) provides that nothing in the Agreement
86. See Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67.
87. Schön, Ten Questions about Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note
22, at 285.
88. See, e.g., Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67 (regarding
Equalization Levies and how things might be different).
89. See supra Part I.D.
90. Model Art. 23.
91. Of course, financial differences might exist in those cases in which standard advance
payments are calculated on the basis of net profits, taking into account that our withholding
proposal calculates tax liability on gross payments.
92. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 115.
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is to be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member
of measures inconsistent with Article XVII (i.e., the national treatment
rule) provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the
equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of
services or service suppliers of other Members. Article XIV(d)’s footnote
6 expands on that concept to cover measures that include, in particular,
the application of withholding taxes to non-residents.93 Therefore, a gross
withholding tax on services94 would not violate the GATS.95 A broader
withholding tax covering also sales of goods might face more difficulties
in this respect, yet income tax rules rarely meet the preliminary
requirements for the application of the GATT national treatment (nondiscrimination) rules, requirement such as application to imports in the
relevant case, and the discriminatory treatment of “like” goods.”96 The
withholding solution will rarely apply to payments for imported goods in
the first place, so there is little reason to believe that a broad withholding
tax would be considered discriminatory under GATT even prior to the
application of the remedial justifications available in the GATT.97
Second, EU-Law. In light of recent decisions coming out of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on withholding taxes,
particularly its Brisal decision,98 certain withholding tax critics have
become more specific and more strident in their criticisms.99 Indeed,
Brisal and other contemporary decisions100 have made it clear that the
CJEU’s Truck Center judgment101 could not be understood as an excuse
to apply different tax collection systems to residents and non-residents.102
93. JENNIFER E. FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND TAXATION
192 (2013).
94. See supra Part I.C.7.
95. In the same vein, with certain nuances on services rendered outside the source state, see
Brian J. Arnold, The Taxation of Income from Services [Arnold, The Taxation of Income from
Services], in UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK ON SELECTED ISSUES IN PROTECTING THE TAX BASE OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 75, at 117-18.
96. Georg Kofler & Yariv Brauner, Interaction of tax treaties with international economic
law, ch. OM3, in GLOBAL TAX TREATY COMMENTARY, IBFD Online (Richard Vann ed., 2016,
updated 2018).
97. Advanced payments on imports of goods were the closest measures to withholding
taxes that were examined under the GATT, and that only in a few country trade policy reviews
cases under the GATT when imposed on importations of goods, a hardly analogous situation to
that of the withholding solution. See, e.g., FARRELL, THE INTERFACE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW AND TAXATION, supra note 93, at 56-57.
98. Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, Case C-18/15.
99. Italian Banking Association (ABI), in OECD, Public Comments Received on the Tax
Challenges of Digitalization, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-comments-received-on-thetax-challenges-of-digitalization.htm (accessed Aug. 22, 2018), at 5.
100. Such as Hirvonen, C-632/13, Judgment, EU:C:2015:765; Miljoen, Joined Cases C10/14, C-14/14 & C-17/14, Judgment, EU:C:2015:608.
101. Truck Center, C-282/07, Judgment EU:C:2008:762.
102. CFE ECJ Task Force, Opinion Statement ECJ-TF 2/2016 on the Decision of the Court
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In fact, with respect to the main issue at stake (i.e., creating different rules
for taxable bases for domestic and cross-border transactions)103 it is clear
from the CJEU’s Brisal and other decisions104 that in principle it is an
infringement of the freedom to provide services if non-resident taxpayers,
in contrast to resident taxpayers, cannot deduct expenses directly
connected to the activity that is being taxed, which difference could well
be found to be an insurmountable obstacle to the application of a
withholding tax.105 Yet, that hasty conclusion would not reflect reality, as
a significant number of EU Member States already allow deductions for
expenses directly related to the respective income obtained by (certain)
service providers resident anywhere within EU/EEA countries.106 In fact,
some of these EU/EEA service provider regimes are the result of the
attempt by various Member States’ to implement the CJEU’s criteria for
an EU law compatible withholding tax.
Third, tax treaties law of non-discrimination. If the withholding
obligation is not extended to purely domestic transactions it would seem
to violate Art. 24(4)107 of tax treaties fashioned after the OECD or UN
Models. However, prominent authors have expressed dissenting views
of Justice of the European Union of 13 July 2016, in Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland (Case C18/15), on the Admissibility of Gross WHT of Interest, 57 EUR. TAX’N 30, 32–33 (2017).
103. As regards the existence of different techniques for charging tax on residents and nonresidents, AG Kokott states correctly that the Court held on a number of occasions that the specific
technique of deducting tax at source for non-resident service providers in principle does not
infringe freedom to provide services (Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, AG Opinion,
EU:C:2016:182, para. 22).
104. See an exhaustive list of this case law in Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered
on 17 March 2016 in Brisal & KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, AG Opinion, EU:C:2016:182, para.
27.
105. Particularly if these conclusions can be expanded to other sources of income such as
royalties or service fees. In the affirmative as regards royalties: Eric Kemmeren, Gross WHT: Is
the Court of Justice of the European Union Back on Track with Regard to Deductible Expenses,
2017-1 EC TAX REV. 2, 7.
106. In particular Andreas Hable & Christian Wimpissinger, Austria, in 97A Enterprise
Services 116 (IFA Cahiers 2012); Claudine Devillet & Xavier Van Vlem, Belgium, in 97A
Enterprise Services 144 (IFA Cahiers 2012) (referred to entertainers for which a limited lumpsum cost deduction is allowed); Lenka Fialkova, Czech Republic, in 97A Enterprise Services 260
(IFA Cahiers 2012); Anders Norgaard & Philip Noes, Denmark, in 97A Enterprise Services 277
(IFA Cahiers 2012) (for entertainers); Borbála Kolozs & Annamária Köszegi, Hungary, in 97A
Enterprise Services 344 (IFA Cahiers 2012) (for individual service providers); René Monfrooig
& Linda Ten Broeke, The Netherlands, in 97A Enterprise Services 501–502 (IFA 2012); Rita
Calcada Pires, Portugal, in 97A Enterprise Services 571–572 (IFA Cahiers 2012); José Manuel
Calderón Carrero, Spain, in 97A Enterprise Services 629 (IFA 2012) (only for services carried
out physically in Spain).
107. Even if articles 24(4) of both the OECD and the UN Models differ in detail, both
provisions essentially prohibit the implementation of deduction barriers for cross-border interests,
royalties, and fees for technical services more burdensome than those imposed for similar
domestic transactions.
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claiming that Art. 24 would not prevent a country from denying a
deduction of amounts paid by a resident to a non-resident where the
resident does not withhold tax properly in accordance with the law.108
This view seems to be exclusively based upon the Commentaries of both
the OECD and the UN Model Tax Conventions when stating that
measures that are mandated or expressly authorized by provisions of the
treaty different from Art. 24 cannot be considered to violate the
provisions of the latter even if they only apply, for example, as regards
payments to non-residents.109 The difficulty in the case of the withholding
obligation is that tax treaties do not specifically obligate countries to tax
but rather limit their taxing rights leaving the actual taxing rules to
domestic law. Nonetheless, in the post-BEPS era when emphasis is given
to anti-abuse aspects of tax treaties and the multilateral aspects of the
international tax regime are increasingly recognized, with the multilateral
instrument symbolizing the peak of such trend, it is not inconceivable to
view the withholding solution from a similar angle, not different than
BEPS action 2 that provides for a denial of deduction and taxation of
income not regularly taxed under domestic law in appropriate
circumstances.
II. WHY NEW LAW FOR TAXING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY?
A reform proposal must first justify its necessity and superiority to
current law. Taxing the digitalized economy is not really a new
problem.110 Yet, until recently reform proposals have not been able to
overcome this first hurdle, where countries repeatedly choose to tweak
the existing rules and rely on increasingly weaker analogies rather than
directly face the inevitability of fundamental reform. Recent measures
adopted by several countries in response to the challenges presented by
the digital economy suggest that the wall protecting the traditional rules
is beginning to crack,111 demonstrating the implementing countries’
belief that traditional norms could not ensure adequate taxation of MNE,
consistently with the concern manifested in the choice of the BEPS
project to make the challenge to tax the digital economy its first action
108. Arnold, The Taxation of Income from Services, supra note 95, at 120.
109. Para. 4 of the Commentaries to article 24 of the 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention
and Para. 4 of the Commentaries to article 24 of the UN Model Tax Convention 2017.
110. See, e.g., RICHARD DOERNBERG & LUC HINNEKENS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (1999) [hereinafter DOERNBERG & HINNEKENS, ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION]; RICHARD DOERNBERG, LUC HINNEKENS, WALTER
HELLERSTEIN, & JINYAN LI, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL TAXATION
(2001); JINYAN LI, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2003).
111. See infra Part III.A.
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item.112 These developments demonstrate that the majority of the world’s
countries are of the view that the current international tax regime cannot
adequately apply to the digital economy, and that past tactics of tweaking
and creative interpretations of the current laws are not adequate
substitutes for reform. Nonetheless the conservative view is often
supported by the perception of powerful countries that they might benefit
in the short term from the blocking of reform. This is primarily because
a fundamental principle of the necessary reform would be to more fairly
distribute tax bases among countries, which seems to deprive them of
potential revenue. Yet, such a view is Pollyannish at best. This Part
demonstrates the inadequacy of current norms, followed by an
explanation why fundamental, technical reform is necessary, and why
tweaking current law is not a viable option, because it will lead to the
undesirable consequences of blocking reform. The rest of the Article
expands on this analysis more concretely with analysis of the various
options for reform.
A. Current Law is (Really) Insufficient and Unsustainable
The inadequacy of the current regime in taxing the digital economy
was a primary trigger of the BEPS project. This Part begins with a review
of the project’s observations and conclusions about the necessity of
reform, followed by additional support for this conclusion.
BEPS Action item 1 required a report discussing the challenges posed
by the digital economy to the current international tax rules,113 based on
an understanding, long realized by scholars, that such rules were never
designed for it.114 The regime failed to adapt to technological progress
and to the ascent of intangibles, as it merely tweaked the rules,115
apparently in an unsatisfactorily manner to fit these developments.116 The
BEPS context was obvious because MNEs, whose use of tax planning
schemes triggered the launch of the BEPS project, all have heavily relied
on intangibles in exploiting the tax advantages of an imperfectly
112. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 23.
113. Id. at 14-15.
114. See, e.g., Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation of Tax Revenue Between
Developed and Developing Countries, supra note 10, at 19, 21.
115. See, e.g., OECD, E-COMMERCE: TRANSFER PRICING AND BUSINESS PROFITS TAXATION
113 (2005), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/e-commerce-transfer-pricing-and-businessprofits-taxation_9789264007222-en. The most significant outcome of this work was the changes
to Article 5 in the OECD Commentary on the Model Tax Convention, resulting in the addition of
paragraphs 42.1-42.10. to the Model Commentary on Article 5.
116. This is evidenced by the OECD identifying the “[a]pplication of treaty concepts to
profits derived from the delivery of digital goods and services” as a key pressure area that must
be addressed by the BEPS project, later reflected in action item 1. See OECD, ADDRESSING BASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING, supra note 16, at 47.
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regulated digital economy.117
The goal of action 1 was modest: the generation of a report, but the
OECD quickly understood that more than that was required.
Consequently, the OECD focused on a few reasonable solutions for the
most important issues at stake. The final action 1 report acknowledges
the need for post-BEPS monitoring and seems to state that the digital
economy taskforce will continue to exist for implementation and
monitoring purposes.118 It is unclear first whether meaningful action will
be taken on any of the issues discussed. But eventually, the Task Force
on the Digital Economy (TFDE), initially a subsidiary of the OECD tax
committee on fiscal affairs, transformed into a subsidiary of the postBEPS inclusive framework, and in 2017 proceeded to work on the
matter.119 Action was taken regarding consumption taxes.120 The road
taken by the OECD and the BEPS project regarding the taxation of the
digital economy has been winding, exposing both the complexity of the
matter and the deep disagreement and conflict of interests among
countries over the optimal solution. One feature of the work has not
changed: the understanding that some form of substantive reform is
necessary because the current rules are inadequate.121
The inadequacy of the current rules and the urgency of reform were
further exposed by unilateral actions taken by a number of countries, all
of which were concurrently participants in the efforts to reach consensus

117. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2012, at A1; Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in No-Tax
Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2012-12-10/google-revenues-sheltered-in-no-tax-bermuda-soar-to-10-billion
(last visited Feb. 14, 2019); Richard Waters, Microsoft’s Foreign Tax Planning Under Scrutiny,
FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2011, 2:38 AM).
118. Yet, no final recommendations have been furnished and no practical action had initially
been taken to actually establish a follow-up forum in the same manner already done regarding
other items, such as the consumption tax aspects of action items 1, 14, and 15. See OECD,
ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT,
supra note 23, at 13; OECD, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE,
ACTION 14 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, at 37-41; OECD, DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO
MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15 - 2015 FINAL REPORT.
119. Generating a so-called interim report: OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM
DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, promising a final report in 2020, followed
by another apparently interim report: OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT: ADDRESSING
THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (Feb. 12, 2019) [hereinafter
OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT], each document’s significantly divergent from its
predecessor.
120. The discussion of consumption taxes is beyond the scope of this article. For more on
that, see, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to the OECD’s International VAT/GST
Guidelines, 18 FLA. TAX. REV. 589 (2016).
121. See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT
2018, supra note 23, at 18-20.
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on the matter.122
Finally, various outfits, including policy think tanks,123 international
institutions,124 European institutions,125 groups of academic
economists,126 NGOs,127 and the French government pioneering the
quantitative study of the issue,128 all recorded information and analyses
on the ineffective taxation of the digital economy under the current norms
of the international tax regime.
B. Fundamental and Technical Reform
The overwhelming data about the inability of countries to adequately
tax the digital economy was predated by burgeoning scholarship both
predicting such futility and explaining the legal problems causing it.129
The BEPS project echoed much of the same analysis, 130 yet increasingly
122. For a more detailed review and analysis of some of these actions, see infra Part III.A.
This was acknowledged and partly reviewed also by the interim report, OECD, TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, ch. 4.
123. See, e.g., BEPS Monitoring Group, TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Oct.
2017),
available
at
https://bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/digitaleconomy.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
124. See, e.g., Alex Cobham & Petr Janský, Global distribution of revenue loss from tax
avoidance: Re-estimation and country results (WIDER Working Paper 2017/55, 2017), available
at https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2017-55.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019).
125. See, e.g., European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council, COM (2018) 146, 4 (“companies with digital business
models pay less than half the tax rate of businesses with traditional business models”).
126. See, e.g., FRANCE STRATEGIE, TAXATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: A SURVEY OF
THEORETICAL MODELS - FINAL REPORT (FEB. 26, 2015), available at https://www.strategie.gouv.
fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/ficalite_du_numerique_10_mars_corrige_final.pdf (last
viewed Feb. 15, 2019).
127. See, e.g., Why Sabmiller Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa, ACTIONAID.ORG,
https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/calling_time_on_tax_avoidance.pdf.
(last viewed Feb. 15, 2019); Petr Jansky & Alex Prats, Multinational Corporations and the ProfitShifting Lure of Tax Havens (Christian Aid Occasional Paper No. 9, 2013), https://www.christian
aid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/multinational-corporations-profit-sha ring-lure-tax-havensmarch-2013.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019).
128. Pierre Collin & Nicolas Colin: Report from the Task Force on Taxation of the Digital
Economy, 2013. English translation, available at https://www.hldataprotection.com/files/2013/
06/Taxation_Digital_Economy.pdf (last viewed Feb. 15, 2019).
129. See, e.g., Kingson, Taxing the Future, supra note 5; DOERNBERG & HINNEKENS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 110; Diane M. Ring,
Exploring the Challenges of Electronic Commerce Taxation through the Experience of Financial
Instruments, 51 TAX L. REV. 663 (1996); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of
Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1997); Arthur J. Cockfield, The Law and Economics
of Digital Taxation: Challenges to Traditional Tax Laws and Principles, 56 BULL. INT'L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 606 (2002); LI, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 110; Lee, Impact of E-Commerce on Allocation
of Tax Revenue Between Developed and Developing Countries, supra note 10.
130. See, e.g., OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
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with a muted voice that is attributed to the politics of the issue rather than
from the countries’ coping with the challenges of taxing the digital
economy using current rules. The inevitability of declaring some success
of the BEPS measures, and more importantly, the consensus-based nature
of the OECD that simply cannot innovate when its members genuinely
disagree on the optimal solution to the challenges, are challenges that all
governments face.131
It would be useful therefore to review the precise flaws of the current
rules pertaining to their inability, not weakness, to effectively tax the
digital economy, providing theoretical support to the empirical case
mandating reform. Note again, that this Article, in line with the BEPS
agenda, assumes that reform of the international tax regime must be
gradual, based on preservation of corporate income taxation and the
majority of the current principles of the regime. This means that a
discussion about replacing the current regime with a consumption-based
scheme is beyond the scope of this Article.132
The first and most obvious challenge is the dominance of physical
presence in the rule for taxing business income. There is consensus that
countries should not tax foreign firms (typically identified by residence)
unless such firms (or individuals)133 sufficiently participate in the
domestic economy, with sufficiency measures in terms of physical
presence in a country. The almost universal rule tracks the tax treaties
norm embedded in Article 5 of the OECD Model, using the PE
terminology. This is a threshold rule that, first, mandates physical
presence for domestic taxation of business income of a foreign
corporation, and, second, clarifies that minimal, trivial presence cannot
justify such taxation—only sufficiently significant (permanent) presence
will.
The implicit assumption for this norm has been that every significant
business presence would require significant physical presence in the
country where it earns income, which makes it fair for the local
jurisdiction to tax the related income to such presence. The power of this
rule is in the intuition that domestic presence justifies domestic taxation,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 78-82.
131. See, e.g., OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT
2018, supra note 23, at 90, 108. Compare, e.g., id. ¶ 245 (“This early evidence of the impact and
implementation of some key BEPS measures holds much promise for the resolution of double
non-taxation concerns exacerbated by digitalization”) with, e.g., id. ¶ 312 (“[T]here is a growing
perception that the BEPS measures will not address the tax challenges that have a broader impact
and relate primarily to the allocation of taxing rights among different jurisdictions”).
132. Although there are many good reasons for considering such more fundamental reform.
See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Commentary: Electronic Commerce and Fundamental Tax Reform,
52 TAX L. REV. 561 (1997).
133. The rules for individuals are basically the same. This Article focuses on the firm
narrative for clarity.
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because such intuition forges the legitimacy of the norm that eventually
became universal. The assumption at the basis of this norm does not apply
to firms operating in the digital economy, since they do not have to have
physical presence where they generate profits.
Consequently, the basic norm for taxing business income cannot be
used to tax these firms. Preserving the basic norm requires a digital
analogy to the physical presence test, which is exactly the goal of the
nexus-based solutions analyzed below,134 yet such analogy inherently
lacks the intuitive legitimacy that the physical presence rule enjoys. It
requires a new formulation of the nexus rule to fit the digital economy, a
formulation that is beyond mere tweaking of the current rule, requiring
first the establishment of basic understanding of the rationale for the
consequential division of tax bases between countries, and, second,
agreement on the details of the rule, agreement that could garner
acceptance by a divergent group of countries with differing interests
(some of which necessarily will find themselves losing revenue as a result
of the new arrangement), in short a tall order that clearly amounts to a
fundamental reform.
A second pillar of the international tax regime is its reliance on the
source/residence paradigm, translated into the general tax bases division
norm of taxing residents on their worldwide income and non-resident
only on their domestic source income. This paradigm depends on a
universal understanding of the residence and source concepts. The
residence rules for individuals were effectively harmonized, yet the
residence rules for corporations proved unworkable, even when countries
agreed on a mutual articulation of a corporate residence test (such as the
common “place of effective management”).
They failed to reach sufficiently similar interpretation of such test,
leading the BEPS project to recommend elimination of a tie-breaking test
for corporate residence, and therefore, leaving the matter to treaty
partners to resolve among themselves through mutual agreement.135 The
source of the problem was the analogy between humans and corporations,
as if the corporate person, like the human person, conducts business
primarily where it is located, and location is determined based on easily
observed, primarily physical attributes, attributes that are easily
manipulable in the case of corporations and, more importantly,
meaningless, since corporate business may easily be conducted in
locations unrelated to the technical legal residence of the fiction we call
corporation. Corporations participating in the digital economy face fewer
constraints in establishing their residence for tax purposes, because they
rely much less on physical factors, such as people and equipment, and
134. See infra Part III.B.
135. See OECD Model Art. 4(3).
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more on computers that could be located essentially anywhere, to perform
their core business functions.
The source rules present a similarly problematic picture despite the
essential universality of the rules themselves. The majority of source
rules have little basis in economics or any other explanatory paradigm,
since their role is to facilitate the division of tax bases among jurisdictions
where such division is itself arbitrary in the sense that it is not based on
any normative theory but rather on a political necessity. They solely
require acceptance or legitimacy to perform their functions. The current
source rules achieved the necessary legitimacy, at least for purposes other
than the taxation of the digital economy. Most source rules depend on
residence, physical location of assets, people or identifiable transactions
such as sales. These bases for the traditional source rules failed to pass
muster in the context of the digital economy: residence, as explained
above, is particularly manipulable and difficult to determine in this
context, physical presence is meaningless, and assets and transactions
“take place” nowhere. Source taxation of the digital economy has been
proven impossible pursuant to the current international tax regime.
A third pillar of the international tax regime is the profit allocation
regime for related party (non-market) transactions. These include the
rules for allocation of profits to PE (i.e., between the corporation and its
branch) and the transfer pricing rules for allocation of profits among
related parties (each of which is a separate entity) engaged in non-market
transactions. Here too an essentially universal norm arose, demanding
non-market transactions to be priced by analogy to “comparable” market
transactions, following the arm’s length standard (ALS). The idea behind
this standard is to prevent manipulation, resulting in inappropriate tax
minimization by multinational firms who completely control the pricing
of intra-firm transactions that absent the transfer pricing rules would
result in shifting of profits from high to low tax jurisdiction, robbing the
former of due revenue. The application of the ALS is difficult at the best
of times, yet the digital economy presents unique challenges:
(1) the firms participating in the digital economy transact in
intangibles significantly more than other MNE, and often generate most
of their income from such transactions, and the current transfer pricing
rules are not equipped to deal with sophisticated transactions in
intangibles;136
(2) the ALS depends on residence determinations that are especially
difficult and manipulable for digital economy corporations,137 permitting
136. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking the Source of the Arm's Length Transfer Pricing
Problem, 32 VA. TAX REV. 425 (2013); Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The
Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79 (2008).
137. See, e.g., Richard J. Vann, Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled
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additional degrees of freedom in their transfer pricing analysis;138
(3) ALS analysis depends heavily on assessments of risk, which is
difficult to quantify and truly impossible to evaluate in an exercise of tax
base division among two jurisdictions when the subject of division is
profits of a digital economy firm, because such firm could essentially at
will shift manifestations of risk to any jurisdiction it wishes,139 a problem
identified yet not satisfactorily resolved by the BEPS project;140
(4) the ALS is poorly designed to deal with highly integrated firms of
the kind that dominates the digital economy.
In conclusion, neither the factual reality nor the theoretical basis
behind the current international tax regime could support the claim that
such regime is capable of adequately taxing the digital economy without
significant reform.
C. The Consequences of Blocking Reform
To complete the argument in favor of the necessity of reform, this
Article argues that blocking such reform is risky and undesirable. The
biggest risk of waiting is to the very international tax regime that such a
conservative approach pretends to preserve. Multiple countries, all of
which participated in the BEPS project and the work on BEPS action 1,
have already enacted unilateral measures to tax the digital economy.141
These measures vary, as is expected from decentralized actions that
respond to particular needs, interests, and internal politics of each country
separately. Once unilateral measures begin to dominate the regime,
standardization and the coherence of the international tax regime suffer,
threatening its stability, especially when the countries jumping the gun
are all powerful nations, naturally hurting the trust of the less powerful
nations in the post-BEPS cooperation effort (through the inclusive
framework), which is precisely the reverse of the desired effect.
III. VIABLE REFORM ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Seven years after the launch of the BEPS project, the OECD, now in
the format of the inclusive framework, is still working on possible
solutions to meet the challenges presented by the digital economy with a
Wonderland and the End of the World, 2 WORLD TAX J. 291 (2010).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See OECD, ALIGNING TRANSFER PRICING OUTCOMES WITH VALUE CREATION, ACTIONS
8-10 - 2015 FINAL REPORTS.
141. See infra Part III.A.
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view of building a consensus among stakeholders around a standard
solution. The work has been slow, and the road bumpy, causing the work
to shift focuses over the years, yet, at the present several proposals have
been presented and evaluated by international organizations, individual
countries, taxpayers (and business organizations), scholars and other tax
experts. This Article contributes to this discourse with elaboration on the
withholding solution and demonstration of its advantages over other
proposals, a task taken by this Part. The Part begins however with a
review of actual countries’ responses, all taking action while participating
in the BEPS effort to reach a universal consensus, controversially
“jumping the gun,” with a view to influencing the final consensus, out of
frustration with the pace or direction of the BEPS work, or simply
because “they could,” taking advantage of political opportunities to
advance their interests, at least until a global solution is adopted, if at all.
A. Actual Countries’ Responses to BEPS Action 1
A review of countries’ responses to the challenges of taxing the digital
economy while the BEPS project is working on a globally standard
solution is important to give context to the comparison of proposals that
this Part makes. First, actual measures adopted and implemented by
countries serve as natural experiments of sorts, contributing to the
assessment of both technical and political feasibility of the various
solutions. Second, although it is too early to assess the impact and
effectiveness of these measures, one could learn from responses to and
assessments of the measures on possible merits and disadvantages of the
various proposals. Third, these measures expose the political aspects of
the digital economy tax discourse, the fragility of the current international
tax regime (inability to stop stakeholders from jumping the gun, the
ineffectiveness of current rules), and the relative power positions in the
regime, allowing some countries to go rogue and at the same time to lead
the consensus building effort without concern about the impact of such
actions on their standing in the future international tax regime, while
other countries (most notably—India), realizing their newly acquired
power to influence the process and make sure their interests, ignored until
present times, are considered in the development of a consensus based
solution, if any.
Perhaps most famously the United Kingdom142 and Australia143
142. UK: Finance Act (FA) (2015). See also HMRC, Diverted Profits Tax Guidance
(updated Dec. 2018), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/768204/Diverted_Profits_Tax_-_Guidance__December_
2018_.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
143. Australian Tax Office, Practical Compliance Guideline, PCG 2018/5, available at
https://www.ato.gov.au/law/view/document?DocID=COG/PCG20185/NAT/ATO/00001 (last
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adopted diverted profit taxes (DPT), colloquially known as Google taxes.
The U.K. DPT was the first notable unilateral measure in the context of
BEPS action 1. It imposes a 25% tax (higher than the normal U.K.
corporate tax rate) on diverted profits, which encompass profits of foreign
companies generated by provision of goods and services in the United
Kingdom without a PE, and profits generated by certain intercompany
transactions lacking economic substance and not fully taxed in the United
Kingdom.144 The Australian DPT, at a rate of 40% is applicable as of
July 1, 2017, and was preceded by a related change to the Australian
GAAR, in effect as of January 2016, named multinational anti-avoidance
law (MAAL), giving power to the tax authorities to apply a penalty up to
120% of the additional tax imposed on large entities (generally
consolidated groups with turnover exceeding AUD 1b) meeting certain
tax avoidance tests. Both measures include multiple tests and exceptions
and seem to be designed to compel MNE to effectively become taxpayers
(and information providers). Both taxes may be exposed to legal145 and
political challenges.146 Although not directly targeting the challenging
features of the digital economy the DPT was clearly designed to combat
particular structures used by U.S. MNE that dominated the digital
economy, most specifically the Google “Double Irish/Dutch Sandwich”
structure.147 This solution is therefore very crude and rife with legal
problems that it could not be, and has not been presented as a potential
global solution; it is the prototypical unilateral solution that disregards
impact on other countries, and a measure that could only be imposed, if
at all, by the most powerful economies that believe they could unilaterally
compel MNE to subject themselves to their scrutiny.
Several other countries adopted versions of the nexus solution, or
virtual PE. Israel effectively adopted this solution through a circular
interpreting domestic law in a manner that permits taxation of significant
economic presence similarly to PE.148 The circular establishes criteria for
identification of significant economic presence, including: operation
primarily through the Internet and performance of activities such as:
visited Feb. 21, 2019).
144. See HMRC, Diverted Profits Tax Guidance, supra note 142.
145. Most importantly compatibility with tax treaties and EU law, see, e.g., Dan Neidle, The
Diverted Profits Tax: Flawed by Design?, 2015 BRITISH TAX REV. 147 (2015) (raising concerns,
especially regarding compatibility with EU law); and Philip Baker, Diverted Profits Tax: a Partial
Response, 2015 BRITISH TAX REV. 167 (2015) (arguing that the DPT should be compatible with
EU law).
146. Primarily due to the discouraging impact on direct investment, see, e.g., H. Khiem
(Jonathan) Nguyen, Australia’s New Diverted Profits Tax: The Rationale, the Expectations and
the Unknowns, 71 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 513 (2017).
147. See examples in HMRC, Diverted Profits Tax Guidance, supra note 142.
148. Israeli Tax Authority, Circular 04/2016 (Apr. 11, 2016). The circular included further
clarification that the same taxpayers are also subject to VAT in Israel.
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identifying customers, collecting or analyzing Israeli market information,
providing customer services in Israel, and developing or maintaining a
Hebrew-language website.149 Finally, the circular clarifies that the
agency PE analysis should apply also for virtual PE, giving an example
of a related-party agent in Israel that makes all of the key decisions
regarding the conclusion of contracts (formal approval of the foreign
taxpayer does not reverse the PE status). Enterprises resident in nontreaty countries should fare worse under these rules triggering PE
treatment with even minimal volume of the above-mentioned activities.
The circular has already been implemented with assessments issued to
the largest MNE operating in Israel without physical presence, despite
the obvious conflict between the Israeli position and that of the BEPS
project, on which the Israeli Tax Authorities supposedly rely in its
interpretation.150 India is expected to adopt a similar approach in new
rules expected to be in effect on April 1, 2019, after the failure to do so
through interpretation of the current PE rules in a manner similar to
Israel’s.151 The Slovak Republic adopted in 2017 a more limited
expansion of “fixed place of business,” to include online platforms
(AirBNB, UBER).152 Hungary adopted a tax on net income from
advertising services, based on the destination of the advertisement and
the location of the targeted public (i.e., without need for physical presence
in Hungary).153 Several other countries seriously considered adopting
similar rules or interpretations, yet have not done so.154 Finally, the
European Commission proposed on March 21, 2018 a directive for a long
term solution for taxing the digital economy based on the nexus approach
and the significant economic presence idea.155 Yet, in parallel, the
Commission proposed a so-called interim solution in the form of a
“digital services tax,” which attracted most of the interest as explained
below, leaving the nexus proposal undeveloped, at least in the present.156
Italy adopted in 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2019, a withholding scheme that
149. Note that these and other activities will not be considered preparatory or auxiliary.
Similar indicators include substantial advertising, marketing, and customer relations activities in
Israel, a substantial number of contracts with Israeli clients online, a large number of Israeli
residents using the online services provided by the foreign taxpayer, and online services aimed at
Israeli resident consumers, in Hebrew or using Israeli currency payment options. Id.
150. See, e.g., William Hoke, eBay Israel Hit With $43.5 Million Tax Assessment, 2018
WTD 82-7 (Apr. 27, 2018).
151. See also OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT
2018, supra note 23, at 138.
152. Slovak Republic, Income Tax Law, Sec. 16, para. 2. See OECD, TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 135-36.
153. Id. at 145.
154. See, e.g., id. at 160 n.5.
155. COM(2018) 147 Final.
156. See COM(2018) 148 Final, infra note 164.
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seem to be a hybrid between a withholding solution and an equalization
levy.157
India chose to adopt a different version of source-oriented solution
with its version of the equalization levy, which it was the first to
implement.158 The 6% levy imposed in June 2016,159 following court
losses of the government of India attempting to tax MNE in India based
on analogy to traditional PE rules.160 It is imposed on the gross amount
paid by business taxpayers in India to non-residents (unless they have a
PE in India) for online advertisement and related services above a
threshold amount.161 This levy also is subject to various legal challenges,
the most important of which is its incompatibility with tax treaties;
proponents argue that treaties do not apply to the levy since it is not
targeting net income, yet it will be difficult to distinguish the levy from
withholding taxes that are universally accepted as taxes in lieu of income
taxes.162 Moreover, if the levy is not subject to tax treaties’ rules it should
not benefit from tax relief in the country of the taxpayer, resulting in
double taxation. Discussions with Indian officials reveal that the levy was
enacted out of frustration with the inability of India to expand the PE rules
within BEPS to include digital presence: India will allow MNE to avoid
the levy by declaring PE in India, applying the normal attribution rules,
and India even seems to prefer a negotiated (hopefully treaty-based)
solution that will allow it to impose sufficient source based taxation.163
The European Commission, as already mentioned, made on March 21,
2018 a proposal for an interim digital services tax (DST) at a rate of 3%
on income from the supply of certain services, including: advertising,
transmission of data collected about users which has been generated from
such users’ activities on digital interfaces, and “intermediation services”
or online platform, all based on meaningful user participation in the
creation of value from the relevant services, which is the justification for
the source/destination based tax.164 The DST is intended to relieve the
157. See OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018,
supra note 23, at 143.
158. The idea of the equalization levy was presented by the final action 1 report. See OECD,
ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT,
supra note 23, at 115-17.
159. Chapter VIII of Finance Act, 2016. See, e.g., Sagar Wagh, The Taxation of Digital
Transactions in India: The New Equalization Levy, 70 BULL. INT’L TAX. 538 (2016).
160. ITO v. Right Florist Pvt. Ltd., I.T.A. No. 1336/Kol./2011.
161. See, e.g., Wagh, The Taxation of Digital Transactions in India: The New Equalization
Levy, supra note 159.
162. See, e.g., Amar Mehta, Equalization Levy Proposal in Indian Finance Bill 2016: Is It
Legitimate Tax Policy or an Attempt at Treaty Dodging, 22 ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 2 (2016).
163. See, e.g., Marnix Schellekens, Report on Seminar H: Recent developments in
international taxation in IFA’s 70th Congress in Madrid (IBFD Online, Sept. 26, 2016).
164. COM(2018) 148 Final.
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pressure on and from EU Member States to tax the digital economy while
a global standard solution is being negotiated.165 The DST is essentially
equivalent to the Indian equalization tax, yet in the European context it
suffered from ample criticism about its legality and political wisdom,166
especially when presented as an interim measures, eventually voted down
by the Member States, yet not disappeared as the European Parliament
launched a new initiative to revive the proposal in an expanded form.167
The United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Austria announced that they
will adopt domestic versions of the DST.168 One can observe the pressure
on governments and international organizations “to do something” about
taxing the digital economy, and the easiest thing to do is to impose a
gross-based, roughly defined, new tax that has the optics of strong
political response even when its legality is cast in doubt, a matter that
would be resolved in the less pressing future. The typical tagging of these
measures as interim measures fits such tactics, yet, it is disingenuous,
since once interim measures are in place there will be less political will
to push for implementation of the permanent, consensus based measures,
and, more importantly, it is unclear how long will it take to reach such
consensus, if possible at all, reminding us of the cliché about temporary
measures being the most permanent of all. Turnover taxes, similar to the
equalization levy in all relevant aspects were also enacted in a few
countries, such as Argentina169 and France.170 Finally, other countries
adopted different measures that involve the taxation of the digital
economy, yet in forms other than the more comprehensive solutions on
the international agenda.171
Although beyond the scope of this Article,172 various countries
adopted new rules for taxing the digital economy with their VAT,173 some

165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Georg Kofler & Julia Sinnig, Equalization Taxes and the EU’s ‘Digital
Services Tax,’ 47 INTERTAX 176 (2019).
167. See, e.g., Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Votes for Strong Digital Services Tax,
2018 WTD 241-10 (Dec. 14, 2018).
168. As did Korea, outside the European Union, see, e.g., William Hoke, Austria to
Introduce Digital Services Tax, 2019 WTD 1-2 (Jan. 2, 2019). See also Alvaro de Juan Ledesma,
Spain: Digital services tax approved by government, IBFD Online (Jan. 24, 2019).
169. Imposed at the provincial level, see, e.g., Jimena Milessi, Argentina’s Journey to a
Digital VAT, 90 TAX NOTES INT’L 47 (2018).
170. Imposed on transfers of audio-visual content, see OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING
FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 146.
171. See, e.g., Romero J.S. Tavares & Aline Dias, What will a Post-BEPS Latin America
Look Like?, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 551 (2016) (discussing Chile adopting extensive reporting
requirement pertaining to the digital economy).
172. See infra Part III.E.
173. See, e.g., Slim Gargouri, Argentina Enacts VAT Rules for Nonresidents’ Digital
Services, 2018 WTD 88-14 (May 7, 2018);
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following the OECD work on similar measures.174
B. The Nexus Approach
The term “nexus” is somewhat imprecise,175 yet in effect the use of
the term became widespread in reliance on an implied nexus between an
item of income and a territory to broaden the traditional PE concept
contained in article 5 of both the OECD and the UN Model Tax
Conventions. Article 5 already includes physical and personal extensions
to the PE concept, contained in articles 5(1) to 5(3) and 5(5) of the
Models, all of which could also be considered manifestations of the
nexus approach,176 yet in the context of the taxation of the digital
economy the term “nexus approach” refers to the various initiatives to
include (at both treaty and domestic law level) an extended concept of
Virtual PE or Significant Economic (Digital) Presence and corresponding
rules for attributing profits to such newly created PE.
1. The Virtual PE Solution
Despite the terminology, the Significant Economic Presence rule is
really about modifying the PE concept for the digital age, suggesting that
there can be a virtual PE, meaning a PE that is fully dissociated from the
current physical and personal presence requirements that have
traditionally characterized PE. The existence of a Virtual PE could
hypothetically depend on:(1) a revenue factor identified, with a
(preferably) high177 threshold of gross revenues generated from remote
transactions,178 calculated on a group basis;179 combined with either (2)
digital factors either in the form of local domain names, local digital
platforms or local payment options;180 or (3) user-based factors, such as
monthly active users, online contract conclusion or data collected.181
This new definition of a Virtual PE is actually not much different from
that proposed in recent academic work,182 in the ‘2018 EU Significant
174. OECD, INTERNATIONAL VAT/GST GUIDELINES (Apr. 12, 2017).
175. And, to make things worse, is often used in the context of U.S. state and local taxation.
176. As well as the common “service PE” provisions, such as article 12A of the UN Model.
177. Intended to minimize administrative burdens for tax administrations, as well as
compliance burdens for the taxpayer. See OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 108.
178. A reference to ‘digital’ transactions is avoided in order not to treat other ‘remote’
transactions (mail-order or telephone transactions) differently. Id.
179. A separate-entity basis should be avoided in order to prevent artificial fragmentation of
distance selling activities. Id.
180. Id. at 109.
181. Id. at 110-11.
182. Hongler and Pistone refer to the provision of digital services used by more than one
thousand monthly users if the total amount of revenue due to the aforementioned services in the
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Digital Presence Directive Proposal’183 and, to a lesser extent, by national
regulation referring to Virtual PEs.184
The proposal has significant advantages and continues to be on the
official agenda of the OECD,185 yet a Virtual PE entails serious technical
drawbacks as well. The breach of the continuity requirement (i.e., the
non-existence of a PE leads from full to zero taxation), that is present in
traditional physical and personal PEs, would become even more dramatic
in the new nexus, where the lack of a single threshold unit (day, dollar,
user or consumer) could lead from full taxation of income attributable to
the Virtual PE to no source taxation at all.186 Additionally shaping the
threshold(s) upon which the concept of Virtual PE is based is a difficult
task;187 as a result, the final rules would be complex and difficult to
other Contracting State exceed a yet-to-be-determined minimum turnover. Hongler & Pistone,
Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of Digital Economy, supra note
17). In fact, their proposal combines a revenue factor with a user-based factor. See also Yariv
Brauner & Pasquale Pistone, Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models:
Two Proposals for the European Union, 71 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 681, 683 (2017) [hereinafter
Brauner & Pistone, Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models].
183. Article 4(3) of the ‘2018 EU Significant Digital Presence Directive Proposal’ provides
that ‘significant digital presence’ shall be considered to exist in a Member State if digital services
are provided through a digital interface and one or more of the following conditions is met: (a)
the proportion of total revenues obtained in that tax period and resulting from the supply of those
digital services to users located in that Member State in that tax period exceeds EUR 7,000,000;
(b) the number of users of one or more of those digital services who are located in that Member
State in that tax period exceeds 100,000; (c) the number of business contracts for the supply of
any such digital service that is concluded in that tax period by users located in that Member State
exceeds 3,000.
184. On February 1, 2018 the Indian Finance Minister presented the country’s then-latest
budget containing a new sourcing rule that referred to SEP based upon two alternative factors: (1)
the aggregate of payments arising from a transaction carried out by a non-resident during the
financial year exceeding a yet-to-be-prescribed amount or (2) systematic and continuous soliciting
of business activities or engaging in interactions with a yet-to-be-prescribed number of Indian
users through digital means. For its part, the Indian budget proposal defined SEP by, alternatively:
(a) a mere revenue factor (on a transaction by transactions basis) or (b) a combination of a userbased factor and a totally undefined concept of ‘continuous soliciting of business.’ The Indian
Significant Economic Presence threshold has been rightly criticized for its vagueness and
ambiguity. See Shilpa Goel, Indian 2018 Budget: New Nexus to Tax Based on Virtual Presence,
KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Feb. 5, 2018), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/02/05/
indian-2018-budget-new-nexus-tax-based-virtual-presence/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2018). Israel
effectively adopted a Virtual PE solution as well. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
185. PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119.
186. For more on the continuity approach and the avoidance of the all-or-nothing rule, even
if unrelated to a VPE, see Wolfgang Schön, International Tax Coordination for a Second-Best
World (Part I), 1 WORLD TAX J. 67, 99-101 (2009). For the same reasoning regarding service PE
or virtual PE, see Báez Moreno & Brauner, WHT in the Service of BEPS Action 1, White Paper,
supra note 26, at 18.
187. For a good description of these difficulties, see Daniel. W. Blum, Permanent
Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Initiative – The Nexus Criterion Redefined?,, 69 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 314, 322-23 (2015)
[hereinafter Blum, Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative].
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interpret. Rules defining thresholds in relation to existing proposals on
Virtual PEs have been criticized for being vague and ambiguous, 188 and,
at the same time, a nightmare of complexity and uncertainty.189 In the
same vein, thresholds, particularly revenue- or user-based factors, may
be easy for a potential taxpayer to avoid, which will, inevitably, lead to
such thresholds being designed on a related-group basis rather than on a
separate-entity basis190 and, for any domestic sales thresholds, to the
application of anti-avoidance rules to address artificial (or resale)
arrangements with non-group members.191 Although theoretically
effective for ensuring the integrity of the system, such rules would add
complexity to already-cumbersome threshold rules. Due to all the above
it is evident that Virtual PEs pose major challenges with regard to
compliance and enforcement. Indeed, according to current proposals
defining significant digital presence, the state in which the PE is located
should become aware and be able to control that a non-resident taxpayer
effectively exceeds the threshold(s) upon which the very concept of PE
is based and, once this has been done, to also control the income
generated and attributable to that significant digital presence. In the
context of a company with no physical presence in the source state this
might prove extraordinarily problematic.
However, the above are just minor problems in comparison to what
has been labelled as the Achilles’ heel of all of the current proposals that
favour a new Virtual PE:192 the attribution of profits to whatever newly
created Permanent Establishment. These problems merit separate
188. In relation to the new Indian nexus to be taxed on virtual presence, see Goel, supra note
184.
189. In relation to the 2018 EU DST Directive Proposal, see Johannes Becker & Joachim
English, EU Digital Services Tax: A Populist and Flawed Proposal, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2018).
190. As recognized by OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 108, and by OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING
FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 188, for revenue-based factors.
Both the 2018 EU Significant Digital Presence Directive Proposal, art. 4(3) and the 2018 EU
Digital Service Tax Directive Proposal, art. 4(6), follow this recommendation. See supra notes
155 & 164.
191. Recognized by OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION - INTERIM
REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 188-89, for domestic sales thresholds.
192. See, e.g., Li, Protecting the Tax Base in a Digital Economy, supra note 75, at 445; Blum,
Permanent Establishments and Action 1 on the Digital Economy of the OECD Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting Initiative, supra note 187, at 322-23; Kofler et al., Taxation of the Digital
Economy: ‘Quick Fixes’ or Long-Term Solution?, supra note 72, at 529; DALE PINTO, ECOMMERCE AND SOURCE-BASED INCOME TAXATION 322 (2003); Schön, Ten Questions about Why
and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, supra note 22; Matteo Cataldi, The Attribution of
Income to a Digital Permanent Establishment, in TAXATION IN A GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 143,
149 (Ina Kerschner & Maryte Somare eds., 2017); Adolfo Martín Jiménez, BEPS, the
Digital(ized) Economy and the Taxation of Services and Royalties, 46 INTERTAX 620, 624 (2018);
OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015 FINAL
REPORT, supra note 23, at 111-12.
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consideration.
2. Focus on Profit Attribution Rules
Proposals based on the nexus approach originally focused on the
reframing of the traditional nexus (or PE) rules to accommodate taxable
presence based not only on physical but also on virtual presence. The
entire BEPS work until 2018 essentially ignored the complementary
profit attribution rules that actually determine the new tax base created
by the reform of the rules.193
On January 29, 2019, the OECD published a policy note on behalf of
the inclusive framework concerning the taxation of the digital
economy,194 followed by a Public Consultation Document, published on
Feb. 12, 2019,195 in which it did an about-face, shifting the focus to the
profit allocation rules. The consultation document includes some vague,
diplomatic language stating in addition that all it says is “on a without
prejudice basis,” and continuing the commitment to not ring-fence the
digital economy. It is clear that it responds to pressure by a few powerful
OECD members to change course from the solutions explored by the final
action 1 report:196 the U.S. and U.K. proposals that focus on the profit
allocation rules, and the German/French minimum tax proposal.197
The policy note states that the purpose of the work on these two
solutions is to counter unilateral actions by states, actions that would
threaten the stability of the international tax regime to the detriment of
all.198 Unfortunately, the transparent concession to the most powerful
nations in the OECD is likely to further weaken the international tax
regime, since it signals continuance of the snub of developing countries
and their interests in general, and also the fundamental requirement for a
fairer division of tax bases in particular. The proposals are not detailed
and therefore could not be comprehensively analyzed, yet a few
observations could be made, none of which are flattering to the proposals.
193. On the scarce previous work of the OECD on attribution of profits to a newly created
Digital PE, see, e.g., Báez Moreno & Brauner, Reforming “Nexus,” supra note 67.
194. Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy—Policy Note (Jan.
23, 2019), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/policy-note-beps-inclusive-frameworkaddressing-tax-challenges-digitalisation.pdf [hereinafter Addressing the Tax Challenges of the
Digitalisation of the Economy].
195. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119.
196. OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 - 2015
FINAL REPORT, supra note 23.
197. See infra Part III.G. The Public Consultation Document includes a lip service to a third
solution it names: the “significant economic presence” proposal, which suggests that it will
continue to work on the virtual PE solution, yet this proposal is drafted in vague and noncommitting language and does not include the analysis that the document engaged in, even if
preliminarily, with respect to the other two proposals.
198. Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra note 194.
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The refocusing on profit allocation gives one the impression that the
consultation document maintains the nexus approach, or the virtual PE as
a viable solution. It provides no technical details that are cardinal for any
assessment of a threshold rule based on the nexus approach and the
condition for its success.199 The proposal simply shifts the focus to the
profit allocation question, using the value creation mantra to camouflage
the fact that it proposes no solution for the basic nexus question.200
The U.K. proposal, renamed as the “user participation” proposal,201
calls for an amendment of the profit allocation rules to take account of
user participation in the user’s country.202 The proposal is to permit
countries where certain users truly provide a benefit to certain businesses
of the type that significantly benefit from the contribution of users, such
as social media platforms, to automatically declare nexus and require
allocation of some profits to such nexus with the view of having
consequent jurisdiction to tax such profits. The proposal does not extend
the rule to all businesses but rather only to those significantly benefiting
from said user participation, an obvious ring-fencing exercise that
violates what was supposed to be the one ground rule that could not be
broken.
Another, perhaps the most serious difficulty presented by this
proposal is that despite the rhetoric about shifting focus to the profit
allocation rules it does not offer any insight into how that could
practically be done. The proposal acknowledges that the ALS could not
be applied, suggesting instead the use of residual profit split with the final
residual profit (the “upside”) allocated based on a pre-agreed formula. It
is unclear how this proposal will fare with the arm’s length orthodoxy in
the OECD when it comes to specify the detailed rules,203 yet what is clear
199. Despite the fact that one viable proposal was made and later discussed in multiple fora,
it has never been fully adopted (neither has a different proposal been adopted) or elaborated on in
the BEPS context. See Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income
in the Era of the Digital Economy, supra note 17, at 2.
200. As explained below, the proposal mentions that it would be possible to apply the profit
allocation rules automatically, which means without determining nexus first, in what is effectively
formulary taxation of business income, a solution supported by many (see, e.g., Yariv Brauner,
Formula Based Transfer Pricing, in THE PROPER TAX BASE: STRUCTURAL FAIRNESS FROM AN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL MCDANIEL 149
(Yariv Brauner & Martin M. McMahon eds., 2012) yet repeatedly dismissed by the OECD. See
OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations, 28, 43 (2017), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing/oecdtransfer-pricing-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-and-tax-administrations-20769717.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
201. See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 9.
202. U.K. Proposal, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/689240/corporate_tax_and_the_digital_economy_
update_web.pdf.
203. See Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra note
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is that the proposal results in very little shifting of revenue to source
jurisdictions, especially to poor jurisdictions.
The proposal requires many threshold decisions which will determine
its impact. This requirement is unlikely to garner support among
developing countries lacking trust in a project that had ignored their needs
to date. These are the same countries that have rejected mandatory
arbitration as a solution for the lacking dispute resolution mechanism of
the current international tax regime based on a similar lack of trust.
Ironically, the proposal emphasizes that its success depends on a
strong dispute resolution component, but it fails to mention that such
component does not exist.204 Similarly, the proposal ignores the cost of
enforcement and administration of such a complex norm which
immediately disadvantages the less wealthy countries, and as market
economies, will make them dependent on information that is primarily at
the disposal of the residence countries or that the residence countries will
more simply cheaply obtain through the goodwill of such countries in the
exchange of such information.205 Finally, the proposal definitely does not
resolve the challenges presented by digital businesses that do not depend
on user participation of the sort mentioned in the U.K. proposal.206
The theoretical justification of the United Kingdom is also debatable.
It does provide an intuitively appealing rationale for taxation at the source
in the absence of physical presence, yet one wonders whether such
rationale could and should be translated into an operative rule or simply
support the fairness and legitimacy need to augment source taxation. If
the latter, then it is useful to garner support for different solutions that
increase source taxation, most of all for the virtual PE proposal.
As an operative rule, however, it faces a few difficulties: first, user
involvement may not be viewed as unique in the context of the digital
economy. The extent of active user involvement in the digital economy
and the active production of content by users may be viewed as
sufficiently more intensive in the digital economy to justify qualitative
distinction from user involvement in the non-digital economy. If this is
the argument for an operative rule it could only serve to tax at the source
a minor segment of that economy making this indeed consistent with the
U.K. proposal.
The focus on user involvement in this context is arbitrary in the sense
that one could think of other ways that digital economy firms can get
194.
204. See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 11.
205. The Public Consultation Document briefly mentions in the last sentence that work will
be done to reduce the administrative burden yet does not provide any detail on the matter. Id.
206. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining about the primacy of B2B in the relevant markets and
the mistaken focus on the more visible B2C paradigm that must be the basis for the user
participation proposal). See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 10.
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involved in the economy of a source country without physical presence
as demonstrated by the marketing intangibles. Moreover, both the U.S.
and the U.K. proposals are conservative (assuming one is neutral about
the political origins of both proposals) in the sense that they accept
physical presence as the benchmark trigger for source taxation, using
digital proxies for that benchmark rather than rethinking it. One could
think about another way of doing the same thing: analogizing the digital
business as a whole to a comparable non-digital business. That solution
seems too obscure and therefore cannot be proposed in such general terms
yet it is exactly what the U.S. and the U.K. proposals attempt to do, just
in a more genuine form.
A second difficulty of the user involvement ideas is its necessary
reliance on the value creation notion.207 This may be viewed as positive
because that notion is pushed by the OECD as a new foundation of
international taxation. However, the notion has received cool reception
once it had to be translated into derivative rules,208 which casts doubt on
the practicality of a user involvement rule. A third difficulty of the user
involvement ideas is its intuitive, yet misled reliance on the benefit
principle to assess taxation at the source. This difficulty pertains to the
idea that users in the digital economy perform productive functions to
such an extent that they should be compensated for them.
Becker and Englisch, wrote an article that genuinely attempts to
advance the discussion of this idea toward a practical solution. The article
suggests an attempt to distinguish between most instances of user
involvement that they admit is essentially passive (i.e., does not
distinguish the digital economy). In those special cases where three
conditions are met: (1) stable user relationship, (2) use of the relationship
in the firm’s value creation, and (3) user network being a sufficient size
or intensity, Becker and Englisch conclude that nexus could be
declared.209 This does not extend to the appropriate profit allocation to
such nexus, a conclusion that does not fall prey to the confusion between
following the benefit principle for justification of taxation and using the
principle to calculate the tax, unfortunately, the OECD and the U.K.
proposal were not so careful. As to the Becker and Englisch proposal, as
such, it is too early to assess it. Without a detailed proposal, one could
207. See Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created, supra note 52, at 166-70.
208. See, e.g., Jonathan Schwarz, Value Creation: Old wine in new bottles or new wine in
old bottles?, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (May 21, 2018), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/
2018/05/21/value-creation-old-wine-new-bottles-new-wine-old-bottles/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2019); Allison Christians, Taxing According to Value Creation, 90 TAX NOTES INT’L 1379 (2018);
Marcel Olbert & Christoph Spengel, International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge
Accepted?, 9 WORLD TAX J. 3 (2017); and Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Value Creation as
the Fundamental Principle of the International Corporate Tax System (July 31, 2018) (disputing
the wisdom of relying on “value creation” as a principle for taxing the digital economy).
209. Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created, supra note 52, at 171.
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not compare it to other nexus establishing proposals.210 As a nexus
establishing proposal, this Article argues that it is likely to be inferior to
the withholding solution explained above.211
The U.S. proposal, not yet fully exposed in an official document of
that government,212 uses the same general approach as the U.K. proposal
but with a view to apply it to all businesses, avoiding the ring-fencing
trap. This proposal views the participation of a business in the source
economy in the form of the development of marketing intangibles that
makes a link to the market economy sufficient to justify taxation by the
latter.213 The justification is built on the inherent relationship between
marketing intangibles and the market economy, a type of relationship that
cannot, according to the proposal be identified for other intangibles
(intangibles being the productive assets in question since other assets
would naturally end up related to physical presence in the market country
if they were to create value in such country) and therefore justifies
reliance on marketing intangibles as triggers for taxation by the market
country.214
This proposal is more sophisticated than the user participation
proposal (in concept—we have not seen a detailed proposal): first, it
avoids ring-fencing; second, it does not reformulate the PE definition but
rather suggests to alternatively allocate profits to marketing intangibles
automatically (once a marketing intangible is identified, it is qualified for
profit attribution) in a manner analogous to allocation of profits to a PE;
third, although it is not decisive about it, the proposal essentially suggests
to use the current transfer pricing rules, in their current format, with the
post-BEPS emphasis on residual profit split to determine proper
allocation rather than fall into the formulary allocation trap. The
uncommitted language demonstrates an understanding that this exercise
will be difficult to implement and even more difficult to standardize, so
an alternative reliance on “formulaic approaches” based on “mechanical
approximations” is suggested for further study.215
The advantages of the marketing intangibles proposal over the user
participation proposal do not extend however to the fundamental
requirement of a fairer division of tax bases. Similarly to the U.K.
proposal, it will clearly result in little shifting of profits to source
jurisdictions and may even result in an even less fair division of tax bases
210. See Hongler & Pistone, Blueprints for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the
Era of the Digital Economy, supra note 17.
211. See infra Part III.B.
212. See, e.g., Jennifer McLoughlin, Politics Driving Debate Over Global Digital Taxation,
93 TAX NOTES INT’L 116 (2019).
213. See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 11.
214. Id. at 12.
215. Id. at 15.
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than the current regime since the richest countries may claim, as the
United States has been claiming for a while—that was the reason for the
invention of the marketing intangible concept in the first place—that
more profit needs to be allocated to them rather than to traditional source
jurisdictions.216 Even more obviously, the more powerful and more
sophisticated jurisdictions will have more resources to fully implement
these difficult to implement rules. Another similarity between the
marketing intangibles and the user participation proposals is the
statement that their success depends on strong dispute resolution,217 a
disingenuous statement as already explained.218 Finally, similarly to the
user participation proposal, the marketing intangibles proposal does not
have any comprehensive theoretical basis, being merely one of many
options to partially tax the digital economy at the source, ignoring the
“bigger picture” fairness and legitimacy requirement from a solution to
this problem.
C. Equalization Levies
The third alternative mentioned in the final BEPS action 1 report,
resembled the withholding option being source-based and generally
levied on gross income, yet it differed from both the withholding and the
nexus-based solution as anew tax to be introduced, outside the current
regime.219 Typically, equalization levies were introduced as interim
solution or quick fixes to pressures related to non-taxation of the digital
economy.220 Interim solutions are generally undesirable, yet particularly
undesirable at the present when there is still some political momentum to
reach a global solution to the challenges that the digital economy present
to the international tax regime, a global solution that is necessary for a
challenge that is global in essence. The mobility inherent to the digital
economy and the interdependence of countries’ economies in its context
necessitate a standard solution that would result in acceptable division of
the tax base, assuming that countries still wish to refrain from double
taxation. Interim solutions distract countries from participation in the
global effort, increase biases since amending existing rules may seem
costlier to countries than adopting a new rule, and diminish adopting
countries perceived benefits from a universal solution. Moreover, the
global effort towards a universal solution may not succeed, leaving
216. For a concise history and explanation of the politics involved, see, e.g., Marc M. Levey,
Philip W. Carmichael, Imke Gerdes, & Daniel A. Rosen, Marketing Intangibles — The Expanding
Global Analysis 27 J. INT’L TAX’N 20 (2016).
217. See OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 16.
218. See supra text accompanying note 204.
219. See supra text accompanying note 26.
220. See Mehta, supra note 162.
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countries with interim measures that they had not originally considered
and analyzed as final or long-term measures, making them manifestly
sub-optimal.
Pragmatically, some of the levies are applied by recruitment of the
domestic payers through either a mechanism akin to withholding taxes or
special reporting requirements. They are therefore substantively identical
to withholding taxes, which means that first, they are not administratively
superior to the withholding solution, and, second, that the claim that they
are outside the scope of tax treaties based on Model Article 2 is weak.221
In any event, they are less likely to be considered creditable at the relevant
residence countries than withholding taxes, either because the treaty
would not be considered applicable to them or because their design is not
sufficiently similar to other creditable taxes.
Playing outside the rules of the game is costly for the international tax
regime,222 and so are equalization levies that present a myriad of potential
conflicts with international laws, primarily EU and tax treaties laws that
the withholding solution does not present.223
In conclusion, on all grounds (leaving speculative political
considerations) the withholding solution is superior to the equalization
levies solution.
D. Turnover Taxes
Turnover taxes resemble the equalization levies in all respects, yet
they tend to be designated as such when applied to particular sectors or
types of income.224 These taxes are conceptually indistinguishable from
the equalization levies and therefore the same critique is applicable to
them.225
E. Value Added Taxes
Corporate income taxation was not the only concern of BEPS action
221. See also Alessandro Turina, Which ‘Source Taxation’ for the Digital Economy?, 46
INTERTAX 495, 518 (2019).
222. See explanation in supra Part I.B.6.
223. See, e.g., Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars, 92 TAX
NOTES INT’L 1183 (2018) (arguing that the high revenue triggers in proposed DST may violate
state-aid law and prohibitions on nationality discrimination in the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, and that if those flaws were corrected, they would be less discriminatory,
but also less politically palatable); Brauner & Pistone, International/European Union/OECD Adapting Current International Taxation to New Business Models, supra note 182, at 681; Kofler
& Sinnig, Equalization Taxes and the EU’s ‘Digital Services Tax,’ supra note 166.
224. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 170 (the French tax on audio-visual content).
225. For a similar approach, see OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION INTERIM REPORT 2018, supra note 23, at 140-41.
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1: “Issues to be examined include . . . how to ensure the effective
collection of VAT/GST with respect to the cross-border supply of digital
goods and services.”226 The relationship between direct and indirect
taxation poses numerous and interesting theoretical and practical
problems, yet this Article, to be pragmatic, accepts the dominant
approach analyzing them separately in the same way that actual
policymakers, including the BEPS project, do.
This Article wishes to address, however, two issues related to this
choice of approach. First, the withholding solution (and the nexus
approach at that) was criticized that it de facto creates a quasi indirect
tax,227 a claim that may be viewed as meaningless in our world where
policies related to the mix of taxes are simply not considered by
politicians. Yet, as already explained by Doernberg with respect to the
withholding solution,228 first, the withholding tax may be creditable in the
residence state and hence should not increase the overall tax burden on
digital transactions, and, second, the withholding solution retains the
right for the taxpayer to file on a net basis in the source country (if the
withholding tax burden exceeds the tax burden on net income attributable
to activities in that country). Second, the mechanisms of the withholding
solution and of a VAT should work in support of each other in the digital
economy. Particularly the option to register in the source country should
correspond well to the VAT registration requirements and the
withholding solution’s information exchange mechanism, through the
standardization of reporting on both taxpayers and transactions should
equally be useful for the enforcement of a VAT, if any.
F. The DBCFT
The destination based cash flow tax (DBCFT) is essentially a
VAT with a separate, progressive wage tax. It is similar to past proposals
to replace the U.S. corporate tax and hence required to avoid being
branded as a VAT, assuming that such branding would make any
proposal politically infeasible.229 It has been promoted by Professor Mike
Devereux and co-authored in various forms and occasions in recent
years.230 In 2017, Devereux and co-author Professor John Vella, argued
226. The final report has dedicated significant attention to this issue. OECD, ADDRESSING
supra note 25,
at 133-38, 147-48 & 152.
227. See, e.g., PINTO, supra note 192, at 183.
228. See Doernberg, Electronic Commerce and International Tax Sharing, supra note 30,
at 1013.
229. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986) (proposing the
X-Tax, a consumption tax with a progressive wage tax component as a replacement for the
corporate income tax).
230. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, Michael Keen, & John Vella,
THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, ACTION 1 – 2015 FINAL REPORT,
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that the DBCFT is superior to other international tax reform proposals to
tackle the challenges presented by the digital economy. 231 Much of their
analysis conceptually resembles the analysis of this article: the analysis
recognizes the inability of the current rules to effectively tax the digital
economy, the DBCFT does not ring-fence the digital economy, it is a
destination based tax (although the motivation of the DBCFT is
efficiency based, while the withholding solution is primarily driven by
fairness, legitimacy and effectiveness of the tax), it works best for B2B
while suggesting that B2C could be handled using similar measures in
combination with regulatory requirements of facilitating financial
institutions
Despite the similar approaches, and the merits of the DBCFT as a
policy alternative, it goes beyond the scope of the analysis of this article
since it would replace the corporate income tax which preservation was
a basic condition of the BEPS project and this article. Note that this
condition is not merely technical; playing outside “the rules of the game”
should open a much wider discussion that requires evaluation of the risks
involved in a more fundamental reform, especially destabilization of the
international tax regime and conflict with other international legal
regimes, such as the WTO.232 From the perspective of the taxation of the
digital economy the withholding solution achieves much of the same
benefits by playing within the rules of the game, and therefore is also
more likely to gain legitimacy than the DBCFT that has not been
welcomed by any country to date.233
An additional advantage of the withholding solution over the DBCFT
is its actual division of the tax base among market and residence
countries, division reflected in the relative low rate of withholding and
the use of withholding which is a universally accepted tax “in lieu of an
income tax”234 and therefore acceptable for double tax relief even in
International Tax Planning under the Destination-Based Cash Flow Tax, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 783
(2017).
231. Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International
Corporate Tax Reform, 46 INTERTAX 550 (2018). This Article is a shorter version of Michael P.
Devereux & John Vella, Implications of Digitalization for International Corporate Tax Reform,
in, DIGITAL REVOLUTIONS IN PUBLIC FINANCE 91 (Sunjeev Gupta, Michael Keen, Alpa Shah, and
Geneviève Verdier eds., 2017).
232. See, e.g., Wolfgang Schön, Destination-Based Income Taxation and WTO Law: A
Note, in., PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF MANFRED MÖSSNER 429 (Heike Jochum, Peter Essers, Michael Lang, Norbert Winkeljohann,
Bertil Wiman eds., 2016); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly Clausing, Problems with
Destination-Based Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 229 (2017).
233. In the United States, it was part of House Speaker Ryan’s tax reform agenda for a while,
yet never gained tract. It was eventually replaced by the initiative that became P.L. 115-97. See A
Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, GOP Tax Reform Task Force (June 24, 2016),
available at http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf.
234. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 903; 26 C.F.R. § 1.903-1.
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credit jurisdictions. The DBCFT is the only and final tax proposed.
Devereux and Vella acknowledge what they call the arbitrariness of
taxing solely based on destination, yet, they provide a few justifications
for pursuing the tax regardless: the location of customer-based
intangibles usually at the source country, benefit principle justifications
for taxation at source (destination in their case), the curtailing of the race
to the bottom triggered by tax competition, and the realization that
allocation of taxing rights is largely arbitrary anyway. This article agrees
with these observations yet notes that beyond support of taxation at
source these observations do not disprove of residual residence taxation
for which the DBCFT does not provide.235
Finally, Devereux and Vella answer a potential challenge to the
DBCFT based on a scenario when a payment is made in one country yet
the related economic activity/customers are located in another country,
arguing that the practical and conceptual difficulties of taxing such
economic activity are significant, probably making such taxation
prohibitive. This scenario is related to the user participation problem
when it comes in isolation from payments and the direct answers to that
problem based on a nexus approach. Like Devereux and Vella, this article
does not dismiss such taxation in principle, yet argues that the mentioned
difficulties seem prohibitive at the present and that the withholding
solution is therefore superior, adding that user activity without payment
and hence without taxing rights may be viewed as problematic yet it may
not be significantly distortive (from a tax base division perspective)236
and it does not present a base erosion problem.
G. GILTI & Co.237
The recent TFDE Public Consultation Document states that the OECD
is now working on a second solution,238 suggested by the French and
German governments,239 and is fashioned after the so-called GILTI rules
235. See Andrés Báez Moreno, A Note on Some Radical Alternatives to the Existing
International Corporate Tax and Their Implications for the Digital(ized) Economy, 46 INTERTAX
560 (2018).
236. See, e.g., Becker & Englisch, Taxing Where Value is Created, supra note 52, at 171.
Even these supporters of taxation in the following of user involvement explain that such taxation
would be justified only in a few, specific cases.
237. Some of the thoughts presented in this Part were previously published in Yariv Brauner,
Editorial, 47 INTERTAX (2019).
238. Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, supra note 194.
239. See, e.g., Stephanie Soong Johnston, Germany, France Explore GLOBE Proposal to
Tax Digital Economy, 2018 WTD 221-3; Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, The German
Proposal for an Effective Minimum Tax on MNE Profits, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Jan. 17,
2019), available at http://kluwertaxblog.com/2019/01/17/the-german-proposal-for-an-effectiveminimu m-tax-on-mne-profits/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
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adopted in 2017 by the United States in TJCA.240 The solution, called the
“Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal” is a minimum tax imposed by the
residence country of a corporate taxpayer on income of foreign branches
and entities controlled by the taxpayer when the branch of controlled
entity’s country does not tax or has low-taxes on such income.241
GILTI is a minimum (yet final) flat tax on foreign income of U.S.
Shareholders that is not otherwise already taxed in the United States.242
It was presented as a tax on profit shifting of intangibles, hence the GILTI
acronym (for “Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income). Its design points
to a different policy: expansion of the U.S. worldwide income taxation,
in line with minimum tax on foreign income proposals that have been
promoted for many years by politicians from both sides of the aisle with
no success until the passage of TJCA.243 The attraction of the U.S. reform,
done unilaterally without regard to the global cooperation efforts in the
BEPS context, to other developed countries, particularly to countries
where multiple, large MNE reside, was in its legitimation of the capture
of more foreign profits in the guise of an anti-profit shifting measure.
Indeed, the Public Consultation Document explicitly states the
purpose of the work on this solution is to address concerns of the rich
countries about the lack of focus of prior TFDE work on profit shifting.244
The basic idea is that MNE will be taxed at a minimum level on a nondeferral basis by their residence jurisdiction, and therefore should not
have the incentive to shift profits to low-taxed jurisdictions. The proposal
naturally shifts taxes to residence rather than to source jurisdictions,
defying, similarly to the other solutions considered by the OECD, the
fundamental goal of fairer division of tax jurisdiction and more source
taxation. To ostensibly balance the distributional implications of the
minimum tax, the proposal accompanies it with a denial of deductions (or
treaty benefits) to base-eroding payments not sufficiently taxed.
The real devil however is truly in the details of such a proposal: it
would require a set of decisions, each of which will be politically
contentious and result in significant impact on different countries (what
is sufficient taxation at the source, for example). Who decides which
countries win and which lose? The response of the OECD to the richest
240. P.L. 115-97. The GILTI rules are in 26 U.S.C. § 951A.
241. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119.
242. See also NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION, REPORT ON THE GILTI
PROVISIONS OF THE CODE (May 4, 2018), 2, available at https://www.
nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2018/1394_Report.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2019).
243. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Obama’s Budget Seeks International Minimum Tax for
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Deal Book (Feb. 3, 2015), available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2015/02/03/obamas-budget-proposal-would-create-an-international-minimum-tax-for-corporati
ons/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
244. OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 119, at 24.
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countries in the Public Consultation Document, shifting the work of the
TFDE to their proposals and abandoning prior, more balanced options,
raises the concern that the old bias in favor of residence, primarily OECD,
raised its head again at the BEPS project. The biased response further
dismantles the international tax regime as developing (and other)
countries with an ability to respond will continue to act unilaterally. This
has been clearly demonstrated by past unilateral actions, such as India’s
equalization levy.245
Note also that this proposal is complementary to the BEPS work on
action 3 and the push for standard, universal CFC rules,246 which was
basically rejected by BEPS stakeholders and should fare worse in the
inclusive framework.247 Such an attempt to bring this idea in the backdoor
via the action 1 work is both disingenuous and unlikely to convince its
original opponents. Supporters of the proposal may argue that it is, like
the GILTI rules, complementary to the CFC rules, and would operate in
symbiosis with them, side-by-side. However, CFC rules are very
different in different countries and many countries do not use them,
making the proposal incompatible with most countries’ tax systems. One
of the reasons for not adopting CFC legislation or adopting minimal CFC
legislation is the cost of enforcement and the sophistication required by
revenue agents auditing MNE on deferred income, which obviously
disadvantages the poorer countries and make such legislation often
wasteful for them. This proposal should be similarly unattractive to such
countries, and therefore cannot expect to receive their support.
The complementary anti base erosion element does not compensate
for the unattractive impact of the minimum tax on source countries: first,
because it requires the source jurisdictions to deny a deduction, consistent
with the anti-hybrids rule of BEPS action 2.248 This rule is very
problematic and unlikely to be in the interest of developing countries that
245. See infra Part III.C.
246. See OECD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY RULES, ACTION 3 2015 FINAL REPORT.
247. See, e.g., ActionAid, The BEPS process: failing to deliver for developing countries
(Sept. 16, 2014), available at https://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/beps_16th_sept_2014_
actionaid.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2019) (demonstrating that developing countries do not trust the
richest nations that they would equally shoulder the burden and fight BEPS, rather believing that
the latter would take advantage of concessions made by developing countries in the process for
their own short term interests). For more conceptual critique of the work on action 3, see, e.g.,
Kimberly S. Blanchard, BEPS Action 3: How Not to Engage with CFC Rules, BLOOMBERG (July
1, 2015), available at https://www.bna.com/beps-action-not-n17179928956/ (last visited
2/16/2019); and Daniel W. Blum, Controlled Foreign Companies: Selected Policy Issues—or the
Missing Elements of BEPS Action 3 and the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, 46 INTERTAX 296
(2018).
248. See OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS,
ACTION 2 - 2015 FINAL REPORT.
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starve for foreign investment. It will complicate the source country’s tax
system (i.e., a domestic entity doing exactly the same thing and claiming
the exact same expense will get the deduction for it while the equivalent
foreign investor will not). Second, a heavy administrative burden is
imposed on the source jurisdiction, most importantly to determine
whether the payment is subject to sufficient taxation in the payment’s
target jurisdiction. Better cooperation among jurisdictions, including
more effective exchange of information about taxation of cross-border
payments would be a valiant goal, but it could not be made the sole
responsibility of the source jurisdiction. The withholding solution
achieves more with less burden on the source jurisdictions, and with an
inherent interest for residence jurisdictions to cooperate as well. In
conclusion, this solution is clearly inferior to the withholding solution on
the base erosion front and clearly unacceptable in terms of fairer division
of taxing rights, having an opposite effect.
CONCLUSION
Almost seven years have passed from the launch of the BEPS project
that is considered by most the most dramatic international tax
coordination effort, perhaps ever.249 It resulted in unprecedented
community of over 100 nations participating, and the majority of them
signing the first (if partial) multilateral tax treaty, the MLI. 250 Yet, the
international community still struggles with what had been the impetus
for the project—insufficient taxation of the digital economy. The
technical challenge is significant due to the complexity of the underlined
transactions and the lack of simple bases for taxation, and most notably
the insignificance of physical presence, which has been the most
important basis for taxation of business income in the international tax
regime. The political challenge however dwarfs the technical challenge
because simply taxing the digital economy is not enough, countries wish
to do so and at the same time preserve the international tax regime, the
249. See, e.g., Matheson, BEPS webpage (“The OECD BEPS process is the most important
development in international taxation in decades.”), available at https://www.matheson.com/
legal-services/beps (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). Itai Grinberg & Joost Pauwelyn, The Emergence
of a New International Tax Regime: The OECD’s Package on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS), 19 ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 28, 2015), available at http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2015/11/
grinberg-pauwelyn-emergence-of-new.html (“unprecedented standard-setting effort”).
250. See OECD, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to
Prevent BEPS, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-taxtreaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2019) (OECD webpage,
regularly updated with links to the official MLI texts, signatories and country commitments). See
also Yariv Brauner, McBEPS: The MLI – The First Multilateral Tax Treaty That Has Never Been,
46 INTERTAX 6 (2018).
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stability it provides to international trade and investment and the ensuing
economic and political benefits; that could only be done if the regime
maintained its legitimacy that suffered as emerging economies, most
importantly the BRICS countries, began, prior to BEPS, to demand voice
in the setting of the agenda of the regime, and fairer allocation of taxing
rights, meaning particularly more source taxation.251
The geopolitical changes that gave the emerging economies the power
to make such demands were coupled with economic changes, not the least
of them was the ascent of the digital economy that left the uncoordinated
international tax regime highly vulnerable and inadequate, leaving all
productive countries unable to raise sufficient revenue after the global
financial crisis, and incapable of implementing unilateral policies to
change that. Yet, old habits die hard. Within the BEPS project, countries
with power continuously attempted to improve their relative positions,
often at the expense of delays in the collaborative effort. Nowhere has
this been more pronounced than in the work on the challenges presented
by the digital economy. Multiple solutions and analyses have been
presented, together with unilateral actions by countries “jumping the gun”
to improve their own positions, yet at the same time providing insights
on the various options for reform. The TFDE however seems to have
leaped from work on one solution to another, with no commitment or
rigorous work on any of them. The political pressures faced by the TFDE
are unquestionably massive, yet are they insurmountable? This article
argues that this is not the case, arguing that the withholding solution it
advocates is feasible (since it does not require wide consensus over a
complex web of rules) and currently superior to all other reform options.
Withholding taxes are the beating heart of source taxation, and the
only technical solution that would guarantee source taxation of the digital
economy, which has been the primary goal of the entire BEPS action 1
exercise, simultaneously maintaining both the legitimacy and the
integrity of the international tax regime. It tackles the core issues heads
on and in a transparent manner, using measures familiar and internal to
the regime, and hence measures that would augment the stability of the
regime rather than threaten it. Finally, the withholding solution also
operates “within the system” by addressing the core BEPS challenges,
base erosion and profit shifting, focusing on the big ticket of B2B
transactions and refraining from populist pseudo solutions that ring fence
the digital economy (in violation of the core principle of the BEPS work
on action 1).
The key contributions of this Article to the international tax scholarly
discourse are: first, a demonstration of the necessity of reform, rejecting
251. See, e.g., Pistone & Brauner, THE BRICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX
COORDINATION, supra note 12.
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the conservative approach that advocates mere tweaking of the current
rules of the international tax regime to face the challenges presented by
the digital economy; second, the Article is the first to provide a detailed
prescription for the adoption of a withholding solution, including design
considerations that no alternative proposal provides; third, the Article is
the first to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of all the realistic
reform proposals and actual country actions, ultimately comparing them
to the withholding solution and demonstrating the superiority of the latter.
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